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THE INTERNET-DISABILITY OR
DISTRACTION? AN ANALYSIS OF WHETHER
"INTERNET ADDICTION" CAN QUALIFY AS A
DISABILITY UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
By Blake R. Bertagna*
As the Internet emerged in the 1990s, the possibility for progress
seemed boundless. However, it was merely a matter of time before
certain adverse consequences of the Internet began to surface. Among
these was an abnormal affinity for the Internet that many have since
characterized as an addiction to the Internet. While different terms have
been employed to describe this problem, a body of research has
developed over the last decade that recognizes the legitimacy of a
condition or disorder grounded in excessive Internet use.
The emergence and growth of Internet addiction has significant
legal consequences for employers. While employers typically have
Internet usage policies that allow them to regulate the manner in which
their employees use the Internet at work, certain legal implications may
be triggered when employees, who have been subject to adverse
employment actions for their improper Internet use, claim that they are
disabled on the basis of their Internet addiction.
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits an employer from
"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual." Certain addictions, such as drug
addictions, have been recognized as disabilities under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Research and case studies are presenting
considerable evidence that Internet addiction, like drug or other
addictions, can have a similar debilitating impact on its subjects.
This Comment explores the viability of a plaintiff s claim that he or
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District Court, District of Nevada. The author would like to thank his friend, Ken Kuykendall, for
his helpful comments and insight, and his wife, Kayla, for her patience and support.
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she is disabled on the basis of Internet addiction and is therefore
qualified for protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
author argues herein that while certain strides still need to be made
before such a claim is available to a significant number of individuals,
there is sufficient research to allow certain plaintiffs, who are
substantially restricted by their Internet addictions, to present a colorable
claim that they are disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
John Reilly was a well-regarded and successful headmaster of
Sandilands Community Primary School in Manchester, England.1 John
was also a father of two young boys.2 Robert Zellner worked as a school
teacher at Cedarburg High School in Wisconsin for eleven years. 3 He
also served as chairman of the Science Department.4 Lee Seung Seop
grew up in poor circumstances in the large South Korean city of Taegu,
5
but was fortunate enough to attend a local vocational college.
6
repairman.
boiler
Following graduation, Lee worked as an industrial
Although oceans apart, these three individuals shared a particular
human weakness--each suffered from a destructive, and even fatal,
addiction to or compulsion with the Internet. John Reilly hanged himself
in a park after accruing approximately $200,000 of debt through Internet
gambling.7
Robert Zellner lost his job after school authorities
discovered that he had accessed pornography websites on his school
computer, which contained nearly 1,500 pornographic images and one
hundred adult-content Web pages. 8 The 28-year old Lee Seung Seop
played an online video game called Starcraft in an Internet caf6 for fifty
straight hours until he was so exhausted that his heart failed, and he
died. 9
1. Andy Russell, Head's Gambling Tragedy, MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS, Sept. 19, 2007,
http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/1 016864_headsgambling-tragedy.
2. Id.
3. Tom Kertscher, Cedarburg Teacher Who Viewed Porn at School Fired, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=385907.
4. Id.
5. Barbara Demick, Gamers Rack Up Losses, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al.
6. Id.
7. Matthew Hickley, Head Driven to Suicide by Net Betting, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 20, 2007, at
24 (original monetary value in British Pounds).
8. Paper Says Teacher Had 1,434 Porn Pictures, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, WI), June 1,
2007, at A6.
9. South Korean Dies After Games Session, BBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4137782.stm; Korean Dies After Two Days of Computer
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While society frequently and deservedly touts the tremendous
benefits and advances ushered in by the Internet, the terrible toll that the
Internet has taken on countless lives can sometimes be overlooked. For
many, of course, the Internet serves as an important professional tool
and recreational outlet. For others, however, the Internet has become a
harmful, even debilitating thing. They use the Internet excessively for a
variety of purposes-from pornography to chat rooms to shopping to
gambling to gaming.10 As recently stated by one Stanford University
researcher, "[a]ccumulating data point to a growing number of
individuals for whom the [Internet] becomes a consuming habit with
significant negative consequences for their personal and professional
lives."'" While the terminology and research associated with Internet
addiction may still be in its infancy, an increasing number of researchers
are recognizing that such a condition exists.'2

Games,
Fox
NEWS,
Aug.
10,
2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/0,3566,165296,00.html.
10. Brenda K. Adkisson, An Overview and Clinical Implications of Internet Use: What Every
Psychologist Should Know 111 (June 7, 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Spalding
University) (on file with author).
11. Elias Aboujaoude et al., Potential Markersfor Problematic Internet Use: A Telephone
Survey of 2,513 Adults, 11 INT'L J. NEUROPSYCHIATRIC MED. 750, 751 (2006). While "there is no

standardized definition of Intemet addiction, there is acknowledgement among researchers that this
phenomenon does exist." Chien Chou, Linda Condron & John C. Belland, A Review of the
Research on Internet Addiction, 17 EDUC.PSYCHOL. REV. 363, 365 (2005).
12. Chou, Condron & Belland, supra note 11,at 365. In one study, over 80% of college
counselors stated that they "strongly agree" or "agree" that Internet addiction is a "legitimate
disorder." Laura Venturini Kiralla, Internet Addiction Disorder: A Descriptive Study of College
Counselors in Four-Year Institutions 103 (Feb. 2005) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of
La Verne) (on file with author). See also Aboujaoude et al., supra note It, at 751; Keith J.
Anderson, Internet Use Among College Students: An Exploratory Study, 50 J. AM. C. HEALTH 21,
25-26 (2001) (analyzing research which indicates that college students majoring in hard sciences are
more likely to be Internet dependent); Viktor Brenner, Pyschology of Computer Use: XLVII.
Parametersof Internet Use, Abuse and Addiction: The First90 Days of the Internet Usage Survey,
80 PSYCHOL. REP. 879, 881-82 (1997) (recognizing Internet addiction and noting that it should be
researched further as some users show symptoms of tolerance, craving and withdrawal); David N.
Greenfield, Psychological Characteristicsof Compulstive Internet Use: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 2
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 403, 403, 404, 412 (1999) (addressing the importance of continued

research to identify subtypes of Internet addiction); Mark Griffiths, Does Internet and Computer
"Addiction" Exist? Some Case Study Evidence, 3 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 211, 211 (2000)
(discussing that factors typically associated with behavioral addiction support findings of Internet
addiction); Mark Griffiths, Psychology of Computer Use: XLIII. Some Comments on 'Addictive Use
of the Internet' by Young, 80 PSYCHOL. REP. 81, 82 (1997) (discussing the need for further research
on the specific nature of Internet addiction); Mark Griffiths, Sex on the Internet: Observations and
Implications for Internet Sex Addiction, 38 J. SEX RES. 333, 340 (2001) (discussing analytical
findins regarding addiction to Internet sex); Louis Leung, Net-Generation Attributes and Seductive
Properties of the Internet as Predictors of Online Activities and Internet Addiction, 7
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 333, 345-46 (2004) (focusing on Internet addiction among people
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One place in particular where the growing problem of excessive
Internet use is creating various complications is at the office. Over
ninety percent of employed Americans spend some time accessing the
Internet at work.' 3 More importantly, for purposes of this Comment, the
majority of such employees spend some portion of their weekly time on
the Internet at work visiting non-work related websites.14 In most cases,
employers have Internet use policies that allow them to monitor and
regulate their employees' improper use of the Internet.15 Violation of
such policies is met with
a variety of penalties including, in some
6
instances, termination.'
When the employee, who is subject to an adverse employment
action17 for inappropriate use of the Internet, claims, however, that such
conduct was the result of an addiction, certain legal implications may
potentially be triggered. These legal implications arise out of the
Americans with Disabilities Act18 ("ADA"). Under the ADA, an
employer cannot lawfully "discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual."' 9
There is currently a federal case pending in the Southern District of

bom between 1977 and 1997); Sunny S.J. Lin & Chin-Chung Tsai, Sensation Seeking and Internet
Dependence of Taiwanese High School Adolescents, 18 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 411, 421 (2002)
(discussing the prevalence of sensation seeking in Taiwanese youth and how this impulse
perpetuates Internet dependence); Kimberly S. Young, Internet Addiction: The Emergence of a New
Clinical Disorder, I CYBERPSCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 237, 237 (1996), available at
www.netaddiction.com/articles/newdisorder.htm (discussing the results from qualitative analyses
which suggest that online users are becoming addicted to the Internet in the same manner that others
become addicted to drugs or alchohol).
13. WEBSENSE,
INC.,
WEB@WORK
SURVEY
2006
3
(2006),
http://www.websense.com/global/en/PressRoom/MediaCenter/Research/webatwork/Employee-Co
mputing.pdf.
14. See id.
15. See infra text accompanying note 303.
16. See infra text accompanying note 303.
17. "A plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a 'materially
adverse change' in the terms and conditions of employment." Galabya v. New York City Bd. of
Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). "A materially adverse change might be
indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a
less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities,
or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation." Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2000). The ADA applies to private employers of fifteen or
more employees and state and local governments; it does not apply to the federal government.
Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). For a disability
discrimination claim against a federal government employer, the plaintiff must seek redress under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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New York, Pacenza v. IBM Corporation,20 in which a former employee

of IBM, James Pacenza, was fired after logging onto an adult-oriented
chat room at work and is now suing IBM for $5 million for disability
discrimination under the ADA. 2 1 His grounds for claiming qualification
under the ADA consist of several psychological disabilities, namely
"internet addiction." 22 Indeed, Congress and the courts have recognized
certain addictions, such as addictions to drugs and alcohol, as disabilities
under the ADA. 23 The body of research legitimizing the incapacitating

character of the Internet and its status as a distinct medical disorder is
steadily growing. 24 As the science and research continue to trend toward
validating Internet addiction, a plaintiff such as James Pacenza may find
that he or she has a colorable claim for employment discrimination
under the ADA.
This Comment explores the ability of a plaintiff to establish that he
or she is disabled under the ADA on the basis of Internet addiction. For
the plaintiff to show that he or she is actually disabled under the ADA,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her Internet addiction
constitutes "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual., 25 This Comment
20. Complaint, No. 04 Civ. 5831 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).
21. Complaint at 3-4, 15, Pacenza v. IBM Corp., No. 04 Civ. 5831 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).
Other parties have previously claimed to suffer from some form of Internet addiction, but they did
not claim that their Internet addiction qualified them as "disabled" under the ADA. See, e.g., United
States v. Tanasi, No. 02 CR.0096(RWS), 2004 WL 406724, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004) (noting
doctor's testimony, which maintained that the defendant's Internet addiction led him to download
pornographic images).
22. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and in Support of Plaintiffs Cross-Motion at 15, 17, Pacenza v. IBM Corp., No. 04 Civ.
5831 (SCR) (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).
23. See, e.g., Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002). "Drug addiction that
substantially limits one or more major life activities is a recognized disability under the ADA." Id.
It should be noted, however, that the term "qualified individual with a disability" does not include
an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs. Id. Rather, the ADA protects
"individuals who have successfully completed or are participating in a supervised drug
rehabilitation program and are no longer using illegal drugs, as well as individuals who are
erroneously regarded as using drugs when they are not." Id. (citing 42 §§ U.S.C. 1210(a)-(b)
(1994)).
24. See supra text and commentary accompanying note 12.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1988 & Supp. 1994). In addition to showing one is disabled, one
must show that he or she is a "qualified individual" and that the defendant discriminated against the
plaintiff "because of' the plaintiff's disability to demonstrate a prima facie case of employment
discrimination. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. Once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of employment discrimination, the plaintiff may also have additional evidentiary
burdens depending on the type of discrimination claim he or she brings and the evidence that the
defendant is able to produce. See Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir.
1995); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 68, 92 (holding that direct evidence is not
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argues that under the existing legal framework, some plaintiffs may
successfully demonstrate that they are disabled under the ADA. The
ADA does not currently exclude Internet addiction as an impairment.
Furthermore, research increasingly shows that Internet addiction
adversely affects major life activities. 26 The most significant obstacle
that such plaintiffs face is to show that their Internet addiction
substantially limits a major life activity. It is this last obstacle that will
narrow, to a very small group, the class of individuals who will qualify
as disabled. For those individuals who do not fall into the select group of
substantially limited individuals, some may possibly qualify as disabled
by showing that they have "a record of such an impairment"; or are
"regarded as having such an impairment. 2 7
Part II discusses the rise and nature of Internet addiction, as well as
the prevalence of Internet abuse in the workplace. Part III provides a
concise discussion of the history and structure of the ADA. Part IV
examines the evidence that a plaintiff will have to produce to show that
he or she is actually disabled. Employing a similar analysis as Part IV,
Parts V and VI respectively examine the evidence that a plaintiff will
have to produce to show that he or she has a record of a disability or is
regarded as having a disability, in contrast to having an actual disability.
Part VII provides a concise conclusion.
II. INTERNET ADDICTION-A GROWING AND COSTLY DISORDER

A. The Nature of InternetAddiction
It is not uncommon these days to hear casual talk of addiction to
chocolate or football. The term "addiction" is thrown around so
frivolously in modem society that most forget it is a defined medical
term. As noted by Dr. Bertha Madras, a former professor of
psychobiology in the department of psychiatry at Harvard Medical
School, "[t]he word [addiction] is grossly overused. Addiction is a

required to prove a Title VII case); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (holding that in a Title Vii disparate treatment mixed motive case, the plaintiff
bears the burden of persuasion that the reason offered by the employer for the adverse decision is a
pretext).
26. See Lori C. Soule, L. Wayne Shell & Betty A. Kleen, Exploring Internet Addiction:
Demographic Characteristicsand Stereotypes of Heavy Internet Users, 44 J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS.
64, 64, 71 (2003).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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neurobiological disorder. Clinically, it's a very clear syndrome. 2 8
The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine defines addiction as "a
dependence, on a behavior or substance that a person is powerless to
stop."' 29

According to Mosby's Medical, Nursing & Allied Health

Dictionary, addiction is a "compulsive, uncontrollable dependence on a
substance, habit, or practice to such a degree that cessation causes severe
emotional, mental, or physiologic reactions." 30 While a large segment of
society immediately associates an addiction with a substance, such as
drugs like heroin, cocaine, or alcohol, the source of an addiction can also
be a behavior or process, such as gambling, that does not involve
"ingesting psychoactive substances." '3I As explained by Dr. Howard J.
Shaffer, an associate professor at Harvard Medical School, "addiction is
not simply a property of drugs" but rather "[a]ddiction results from the
relationship between a person and the object of their addiction. 3 2 For
Internet addicts, their "drug of choice" and object of their addiction is
the Internet.33
The notion of a disorder grounded in excessive Internet use has
been receiving increasing consideration since the mid-1990s. 34

The

terminology for this exact condition is problematic because "there is no
standardized definition of Internet addiction., 35 Researchers have
proposed a variety of titles for the condition: Internet addiction, Internet
Addiction Disorder, Internet pathological use, Internet dependency,36
and compulsive Internet use are just some of the terms that have been
used.37 For purposes of this Comment, the term "Internet addiction" will
be used to embrace the overall phenomenon. A workable general
definition for Internet addiction may be "a preoccupation with computer
28. Craig Lambert, Deep Cravings: New Research on the Brain and Behavior Clarifies the
Mysteries ofAddiction, HARV. MAG., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 60, 60.
29. THE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 40 (1999).
30. MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 32 (5th ed. 1998).
31. Howard J. Schaffer, What is Addiction?: A Perspective, HARV. MED. SCH. DIVISION ON
ADDICTIONS, July 3, 2007, http://www.divisiononaddictions.org/html/whatisaddiction.html.
32. Id.
33. Jane E. Brody, Cybersex Gives Birth to a Psychological Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2000, at F7.
34. Soule, Shell & Klcen, supra note 26, at 65. Although the beginning of the Internet dates
back to as far back as the early 1950s, the World Wide Web was not launched until 1991, after
which it still took a few more years for consumers generally to be able to navigate the Intemet.
Adkisson, supra note 10, at 4-5.
35. Chou, Condron & Belland, supra note 11, at 365.
36. See id.
37. Timothy Liu & Marc N. Potenza, Problematic Internet Use: Clinical Implications, 12
at
453
(2007)
available
MED.
INT'L
J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC

http://www.cnsspectrums.com/aspx/articledetail.aspx?articleid= 1094.
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usage that is overly time-consuming, causes personal distress (mostly
through one's sense of loss of control), and has the potential to cause
interpersonal, occupational, financial, or legal consequences.' 3 8
Two critical considerations for whether one suffers from Internet
addiction seem to be (1) the amount of time spent online, as well as (2)
the purpose for which one is using the Internet. According to Stanford's
Dr. Aboujaoude, research has shown the standard subject of Internet
addiction to be "a college-educated single white male in his fourth
decade, with substantial psychiatric comorbidity, who spends -30
hours/week on computer use that is not essential to his work or well
being, resulting in significant subjective distress and functional
impairment. 3 9 In one study performed by Dr. Kimberly Young, 396
Internet-dependent subjects reported spending an average of 38.5 hours a
week on the Internet, in contrast to the 4.9 hour average of the
nondependent Internet user subjects.4 ° In a study performed by Chou
and Hsiao, 6% of Internet addicts were found to spend twenty to twentyfive hours a week on the Internet, which was three times the amount of
hours spent by the 856 non-addicts. 41 This excessive time spent online
involves activities that are unrelated or unessential to work or one's
personal well-being: e-mail, chat rooms, gambling websites,
pornography websites, blogs, and/or shopping websites like eBay. 42
It should be noted that Internet addiction is not a widespread
phenomenon. Although the figure varies depending on the particular
study, the percentage of the population that may qualify as being Internet
addicts is thought to be as high as 14% of the population.4 3 Nonetheless,
38. Donald W. Black, Geeta Belsare & Steven Schlosser, Clinical Features, Psychiatric
Comorbidity, and Health-Related Quality of Life in Persons Reporting Compulsive Computer Use
Behavior, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 839, 839 (1999).
39. Aboujaoude et al., supra note 11,751.
40. Chien Chou, Internet Heavy Use and Addiction Among Taiwanese College Students: An
Online Interview Study, 4 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEn. 573, 574 (2001) (discussing Young, supra
note 12, at 239).
41. Chou, Condron & Belland, supra note 11,at 368 (citing Chien Chou & Ming-Chun Hsiao,
Internet Addiction, Usage, Gratification, and Pleasure Experience: The Taiwan College Students'
Case, 35 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 65, 73-74 (2000)).
42. Aboujaoude et al., supra note 11,751.
43. See Black, Belsare & Schlosser, supra note 38, at 841 tbl.2; see also Chou, Condron &
Belland, supra note 11, at 373 (discussing a study indentifying about 6% of respondents as Internet
addicts) (citing Chou & Hsiao, supra note 41, at 73); Liu & Potenza, supra note 37 (citing studies
that estimate 3-11% of respondents were Internet addicts); Nathan A. Shapira et al., Problematic
Internet Use: Proposed Classification and Diagnostic Criteria, 17 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 207,
212 (2003) (discussing research that 6-14% of individuals that use the Internet are susceptible to
Internet Addiction) (citing Tori DeAngelis, Is Internet Addiction Real?, 31 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL.,
Apr. 2000, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/aprOO/addiction.html); Leo Sang-Min Whang et
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if even 6% of the 175 million Internet users in the United States are
struggling with Internet addiction, then roughly ten million Americans
may have a basis for claiming protection under the ADA. 44
Several conceptual models have been proposed to understand and
diagnose Internet addiction, but none have yet to be uniformly accepted
by researchers. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders ("DSM") is considered "the bible of mental-health care" by
some. 45 The DSM "summarizes some of the diagnostic criteria for
mental disorders that are used by the psychiatric and mental health
professions. 46 Initially, researchers treated Internet addiction similar to
a substance-related disorder, as classified in the DSM. 47 According to
Dr. Kimberly Young, if a patient satisfied more than three of the seven
diagnostic criteria for a substance-related disorder, as articulated in the
DSM, then that patient could be diagnosed with Internet addiction.48
Eventually, some researchers, including Dr. Young, turned from the
substance-related model and began conceptualizing Internet addiction as
an impulse control disorder. 49 One behavioral addiction in particular,
namely pathological gambling, has been deemed similar to Internet
Other researchers have proposed alternative models,
addiction.5 °
al., Internet Over-Users' Psychological Profiles: A Behavior Sampling Analysis on Internet
Addiction, 6 CYBERPYSCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 143, 144 (2003) (discussing a study finding 5-10% of
respondents to be Internet addicts). Coincidentally, this figure resembles the percentage of the
population who gambles or drinks alcohol and is likewise susceptible to gambling or alcohol
addictions. See Karyn Dayle Jones & Neresa B. Minatrea, The Consequences ofInternet Addiction.
Implications for Counseling Practice, 2 J. TECH COUNSELING, July 2001, available at
http://jtc.colstate.edu/vol2-l/Addiction.htm.
44. Bob Tedeschi, From Clipouts to the Web, Coupons Transition Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2007, at C5.
45. Nancy Shute, Paying a High Pricefor Mental Health, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 5,
2007, at 60, 61. The DSM is currently in its fourth edition. Id.
46.

135 CONG. REC. 20572 (1989).

47. Liu & Potenza, supra note 37.
48. See id.
49. An impulse control disorder is "a disorder in which individuals usually experience rising
tension or arousal before an action(s) and subsequently experience a sense of relief or pleasure after
completion of the behavior(s)." Shapira et al., supra note 43, at 212. Young articulated the
following eight criteria to diagnose those with Intemet addiction, which is based on the DSM's
criteria for pathological gambling: (1)preoccupation with the Internet; (2) need for longer amounts
of time online; (3) repeated attempts to reduce Internet use; (4) withdrawal when reducing Internet
use; (5) time management issues; (6) environmental distress (family, school, work, friends); (7)
deception around time spent online; (8) mood modification through Internet use. Kiralla, supra note
12, at 39. Young considered a patient addicted if he or she answered "Yes" to five or more of the
criteria listed above. Id. (citing Kimberly S. Young, Internet Addiction: Symptoms, Evaluation, and
Treatment, 17 INNOVATIONS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (L. VandeCreek & T.L. Jackson eds., 1999),

available at http://www.netaddiction.com/articles/symptoms.htm).
50. See Kiralla, supra note 12, at 39.
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ultimately based on a type of impulse control disorder.5'
The Internet has certain unique characteristics that make it
particularly prone to creating dependencies. First, there is the speed with
which the Internet can deliver content. 2 The number of Americans
getting access to broadband Internet is increasing by thirty percent a
year.53 For example, from February 2005 to February 2006, the number
of Americans receiving broadband leaped from 74.3 million to 95.5
million.54 As a result, Internet users can have instant gratification. While
one might assume that the quicker access would result in less time on the
computer, research shows the opposite-"[w]ith fast connection to Web
sites for online photos, audio and video files, online visitors are devoting
more time to their computers. 55
Second, there is the accessibility that the Internet provides to the
desired content.56 Today, the Internet is reaching nearly seventy-five
percent of American homes 57 and approximately eighty million
Americans have Internet access at work, 58 granting almost any American
access to the Internet.
Third, with increased accessibility comes decreased cost. 59 Users
can access the information they want for little or no cost.
Fourth, there is the breadth and potency of the content that the
Internet delivers. 60 As the Internet develops and bandwidth increases,

51. See, e.g., Shapira et al., supra note 43, at 212. Shapira and colleagues articulated three
criteria to diagnose a subject with Internet addiction:
A. Maladaptive preoccupation with Internet use, as initiated by at least one of the
following.
1.Preoccupations with use of the Internet that are experienced as irresistible.
2. Excessive use of the Internet for periods of time longer than planned.
B. The use of the Internet or the preoccupation with its use causes clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas
of functioning;
C. The excessive Internet use does not occur exclusively during periods of
hypomania or mania and is not better accounted for by other Axis I disorders.
Id. at 213.
52. Chou, Condron & Belland, supra note 11,at 375.
53. Press Release, Nielsen/NetRatings, Two-Thirds of Active U.S. Web Population Using
Broadband, Up 28 Percent Year-Over-Year to An All-Time High (Mar. 14, 2006),
http://www.netratings.com/pr/pr-060314.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Chou, Condron & Belland, supra note 11,at 375-77.
57. Nielsen/NetRatings, supra note 53.
58. MRI CYBERSTATS, INTERNET ACCESS AND USAGE, PERCENT OF ADULTS 18+ (2006),
http://www.siia.net/software/pubs/usage_06.pdf.
59. Chou, Condron & Belland, supra note 11,at 377.
60. Id. at 375-77.
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the Internet can deliver "multimedia resources in greater amounts and
higher quality,"
which in turn delivers greater stimulation and
61
satisfaction.

Fifth, there is anonymity.62 Most individuals do not wish to
publicize their involvement in certain activities, especially gambling,
pornography, or adult-oriented chat rooms.
Finally, many find the interactivity of the Internet appealing.6 3 The
Internet provides users the opportunity to meet new people and to do so
in a "socially safe and secure environment." 64
Studies are increasingly giving credence to the formal recognition
of Internet addiction. In 2006, Mount Sinai School of Medicine
researchers conducted a study on compulsive Internet use. 65 The
researchers concluded that between 3.7% to 13.7% of the Americans
tested exhibited one or more signs of compulsive Internet use.66 The
Mount Sinai study revealed that approximately 14% of the subjects said
it was difficult to abstain from the Internet for a period of a few days;
nearly 9% admitted to concealing their Internet use from loved ones; and
roughly 6% reported that their relationships had suffered due to their
excessive Internet use.67 Dr. Elias Aboujaoude, director of Stanford's
Impulse Control Disorders Clinic, stated the following:
a small but growing number of Internet users are starting to visit their
doctors for help with unhealthy attachments to cyberspace ... [and

that] these patients' strong drive to compulsively use the Internet to
check e-mail, make blog entries or visit Web sites or chat rooms, is not
unlike what sufferers of substance abuse or impulse-control disorders
experience: a repetitive, intrusive and irresistible urge to perform an
act that may be pleasurable in the moment but that can
68 lead to
levels.
professional
and
personal
the
on
problems
significant
Increasingly, professionals are recognizing that a problematic use

61.
62.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 381.

63.

Id.

64.
65.
66.

Id.
Aboujaoude etal., supra note 11, at 751.
Id. at 753.

67. Id.
68. Recent studies from Standford University, HEALTH & MED. WEEK, Aug. 27, 2007, at
4940. In addition, Dr. Aboujouade states, "people will tell me that they feel restless when they go
for a whole afternoon without checking e-mail, there is mounting anxiety when they try to cut back
on their online use." Catherine Holahan, Virtually Addicted, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Dec. 14, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2006/tc20061214_422859.htm?chan=search.
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of the Internet is developing in a certain segment of the population.69
Studies have shown that pathological Internet use has consequences that
are "far reaching, with many subjects going without sleep, being late for
work, ignoring family obligations, and suffering financial and legal
consequences. '7 °
B. Internet in the Workplace
Although the Internet was originally envisioned as a means to
increasing employee productivity, and no doubt fills that need, it has
also produced an appealing distraction for employees.7 1 In describing
the nature of this temptation, one Johns Hopkins University professor
states, "[t]he issue is now you have something that seems to be
genuinely irresistible because it's such a gateway to the whole planet
that's right there on your desk and easily concealed to people passing
by."72 Wasting time at work gazing into the world of the Internet, or
"cyberslacking," has become a costly epidemic for employers
worldwide.7 3
One cost of employee Internet abuse for employers is the loss of
employee efficiency. As of 2002, one study estimated that Internet
misuse was costing American businesses over $85 billion a year in loss
of productivity.74 According to a 2005 Gallup Organization report,
employees were spending nearly seventy-five minutes a day at work
using their computers for non-work related purposes.7 5 At $20 an hour,
such conduct was costing employers about $6,250 per employee per year
in loss of work productivity.7 6 According to one state government
analyst, who has a master's degree and is considered a valuable

69. See Aboujaoude et al., supra note 11, at 751.
70. Dan J. Stein et al., Hypersexual Disorderand Preoccupation With Internet Pornography,
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1590, 1593 (2001).

Juline E. Mills et al., Cyberslacking!A Liability Issuefor Wired Workplaces, 42 CORNELL
34, 36 (2001).
72. Corinne Heller, Don't let your boss catch you reading this, REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL2067072120070829.
73. See id.
74. Workplace Web Abuse Costs CorporateAmerica $85 Billion This Year, Reports Websense
Inc.; Internet Abuse Continues to Increase,Jumps 35 Percent Year Over Year, Bus. Wire, Nov. 12,
2002,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Workplace+Web+Abuse+Costs+Corporate+America+$85+Billion+
This+Year,...-a094155338.
75. Adrienne Fox, Caught in the Web, 52 HR MAG. 35, 36 (2007), available at
http://www.shrm.org/hrmagazine/articles/1207/1207Fox2_cover.asp.
76. Id.
71.

HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q.
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employee within her department, she has become addicted to the
Internet. 7 She describes her problem by stating the following:
I spend five to six hours a day surfing the Internet at work... I know I
can get my work done in the last two hours a day, so I cram at the last
minute and spend the rest of the time reading newspapers online,
checking e-mail
every five minutes and looking at my bank
78
statements.
Another cost of employee Internet abuse for employers is the legal
liability that the employer may incur. In the last few years, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has filed multiple
causes of action against employers based on complaints lodged by
current or former employees "who claimed they saw co-workers viewing
or distributing adult-oriented material at work. ' 79 For example, Sierra
Aluminum recently settled a lawsuit for $200,000, resulting from its
termination of an employee who had complained that she saw an
assistant manager viewing pornography on his work computer. 80 Also,
an employer could possibly be held liable for defamation if an employee
sends defamatory statements via a work e-mail or posts such comments
on an employer-related website. 8 1 Another cost may be criminal
liability. Once an employee begins using his or her work computer to
store or distribute child pornography, or solicit minors for sexual
encounters via e-mail or chat rooms, the employee is breaking the law,
which may trigger certain duties on the part of the employer to know
what its employees are doing. In a recent case, a New Jersey appellate
court held that if an employer has actual or constructive knowledge that
an employee is viewing child pornography at his or her workstation, the
employer has a duty to take certain steps to prevent the employee from
engaging in such conduct. 83 If the employer fails to exercise this duty,
the employer may be
held responsible for the foreseeable harm to an
84
party.
third
innocent

77. Id. at 35.
78. Id.
79. Stephanie Armour, Technology makes porn easier to access at work, USA TODAY, Oct.
18, 2007, at IA.

80.
81.
2006, at
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Words of warning on employee comments on 'blogs,' BIRMINGHAM POST (UK), Sept. 5,
22.
See, e.g., Doe v. XYZ Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1167-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
Id.
Id.
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Furthermore, the websites visited and material downloaded by
employees while at work may jeopardize the security of the employer's
network, through such threats as viruses and hackers, incurring more
costs for the employer. 85 A 2005 study analyzing the Internet activity of
over ten thousand employees found that "more than nineteen percent of
personal use involved Web sites that posed a potential security threat to
the network, and eight percent involved sites that posed legal liability
risks for the employer., 86 According to one 2004 study, computer
viruses cost business and individuals between $13.5 to $82 billion a
yearY Although employee Internet misuse may not be at the top of
most companies' lists of costs, this online behavior is a "silent epidemic"
that is insidiously taking a toll on employers nationwide.88
III. THE

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

In 1988, although many significant strides had been made in
establishing equal treatment of previously disenfranchised segments of
society, America's disabled population still suffered severe inequities.
With reference to the legislative landscape for the disabled at this time,
U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh testified before a House
Subcommittee that "civil rights laws protecting disabled persons [had]
been enacted in piecemeal fashion" and that "serious gaps" existed in the
law. 89 As a result, disabled Americans experienced "lower graduation
rates, lower employment rates, higher poverty rates, and less personal
freedom and independence." 90
In 1988, presidential hopeful Vice-President George H.W. Bush
urged Congress to enact the Americans with Disabilities Act. 91 Upon his
inauguration as president, President Bush made Attorney General

85.

Corey E. Stephenson, Employer concerns grow with increased employee Internet use,

MICH.
LAW.
WKLY.,
May
22,
2006,
available
at
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-15532354-ITM.
86. Id.
87. Adkisson, supra note 10, at 12.
88. Lawrence Budd, Watching porn at work a 'silent epidemic', DAYTON DAILY NEWS (OH),
Sept. 30, 2007, at A9. Websense, Inc. estimates that over 50% of employees spend between one
and five hours per week on the Internet at work for personal reasons. Aaron Latto, Managing Risk
from Within: Monitoring Employees the Right Way, RISK MGM'T MAG., Apr. 2007, at 32.
According to Websense, "American business lose $85 billion a year from the misuse of the Internet
in the workplace." Id.
89. H.R. REP. No. 472-490, pt. 2, at 48 (1990).
90. H.R. REP. No. 109-196, pt. 1, 2 (2005).
91. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 5 (2005).
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Thomburgh responsible for working with Congress to pass disability
discrimination legislation.92 A year and a half later, on July 26, 1990,
93
President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act into law.
At the signing the Americans with Disabilities Act, President Bush
declared the new piece of legislation to be "an historic opportunity...
signal[ing] the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life. 94
In drafting the ADA, Congress looked in large part to the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for a model.95 Wishing to create broader
protection for the disabled community than existed in the early 1970s,
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to protect disabled
Americans from disability discrimination by entities receiving federal
financial assistance.96 Modeling the language of the act on Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which prohibited race discrimination by
federally funded entities), the Rehabilitation Act provided the following:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section 7 (6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied of, or be subjected to
discrimination under
97 any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.
Section 7 (6), which was codified and generally referred to as
Section 504, eventually defined a "handicapped individual" as, "[a]ny
person who (a) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (b) has a record
of such an impairment, or (c) is regarded as having such an
impairment." 98
However, the Rehabilitation Act's protection was limited to
disability discrimination by federally funded entities 99-a gap that
spawned the need for more expansive legislation in the form of what
became the ADA. In light of the extensive regulations and case law
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act that had accumulated by the time

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1070,
1071 (July 26, 1990).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

COLKER, supranote 91, at 9-12.
Id. at 11.
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)).
Id. at 12 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (2000)).
Id. at 11.
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Congress began drafting the ADA, Congress looked to and imported
much of the Rehabilitation Act's language in drafting the ADA. 00 Like
those legislators who drafted the Rehabilitation Act, Congress similarly
modeled the ADA on several titles of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,
0
which treated various forms of racial discrimination.'
The pervasive influence of the Rehabilitation Act on the ADA is
evident from the fact that "Congress drew the ADA's definition of
disability almost verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped
individual' in the Rehabilitation Act."' 1 2 The ADA defines "disabled
individual" as one with:
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of the individual;
a record of such an impairment; or
03
being regarded as having such an impairment. 1

The ADA is comprised of five titles, three of which are directed at
preventing three distinct forms of disability discrimination.' 0 4 Title I
prohibits employment discrimination. 105 Title II prohibits disability
discrimination by any "public entity,"'' 0 6 which largely includes "any
State or local government.' '0 7
Title III prohibits disability
discrimination in the equal enjoyment of "public accommodations"' 0 8
and "public transportation services."' 0 9 Upon the ADA's enactment,
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) declared the ADA to be "the most
sweeping piece of civil rights legislation since the Civil War era.""1 0
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 17.
102. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1991).
104. Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 170 (ist Cir. 2006).
105. 42U.S.C. § 12112(a).
106. Id. § 12132.
107. Id. § 12131(l)(A).
108. Id. § 12182(a).
109. Id. § 12184(a).
110. 135 CONG. REc. 19,804 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Although there were high
hopes for the impact that the ADA would have for the disabled community, evidence suggests that
the hopes of legislators and politicians may have been too high, for instance, only a mere third of
disabled individuals have employment. COLKER, supra note 91, at 69. Of the unemployed disabled
population, two-thirds would prefer to be employed. Id. Roughly one-third of disabled individuals
are impoverished (compared to ten percent of non-disabled individuals). Id. Also, "[t]wenty-two
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Although lawmakers clearly intended the ADA to be "sweeping" in
its protection of disabled employees, parties seeking relief under the
ADA soon faced considerable opposition from the judiciary. The U.S.
Supreme Court issued several decisions that narrowly construed the
meaning of "disability" and read into the ADA certain limitations that
severely limited petitioners in showing that they were "disabled" for
purposes of the ADA. Believing that the courts ultimately strayed from
the path that Congress had paved for them in enacting the ADA, in
September 2008, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act ("ADAAA") to restore protection for the broad range
of individuals with disabilities as originally envisioned by Congress.'
President Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25, 2008.1 12
The ADAAA's purpose is to "clarify the intention and enhance the
protections of the [ADA] of 1990, landmark civil rights legislation that
provided 'a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the
1 13
disability.'
of
basis
the
on
discrimination
of
elimination
The remainder of this Comment will evaluate whether the ADA is
sufficiently "sweeping" to protect those suffering from a condition that
could not possibly have been envisioned by legislators when Senator
Hatch made this statement in 1989-namely, addiction to the Internet.
IV. INTERNET ADDICTION-DISABILITY?

The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.
. . in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 1 4 To prevail under an ADA claim, the plaintiff must first

percent of individuals with disabilities fail to complete high school, compared with [nine] percent of
the nondisabled population ... [p]eople with disabilities are more than twice as likely to postpone

needed health care because they cannot afford it ([twenty-eight] percent compared with [twelve]
percent)." Id.
111.
112.

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2008).
WhiteHouse.gov, Presidential News & Speeches, President Bush Signs S. 3406 Into Law

(Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080925-8.html.
113. 154 CONG. REC. S8840-01, Statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 3406, The
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (statement of

Sen. Harkin).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1991). Prior to filing a lawsuit under the ADA, a plaintiff must
first exhaust his or her administrative remedies. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176,
1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing MacKenzie v. Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005)). First,
the plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. (citing Jones v. Runyon, 91
F.3d 1398, 1399 n.1 (10th Cir, 1996)). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to put the
employer on notice of the complaint and assist in the amicable resolution of the dispute. Rodriguez
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and foremost establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which will
require the plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) he or she is "disabled"
according to the ADA's definition of the term; (2) that he or she is
qualified to perform the essential functions of his or her prior job, with
or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that his or her employer
5
discriminated against the plaintiff because of the plaintiffs disability." 1
A plaintiff seeking redress for employment discrimination based on
Internet addiction will likely learn that the establishment of his or her
prima facie case generally is no easy task. Although the ADA was

Velazquez v. Autoridad Metropolitana de Autobuses, 502 F. Supp. 2d 200, 208 (D.P.R. 2007). The
plaintiffs submission has to satisfy certain minimum requirements to satisfy his or her duty. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 502 F.3d at 1184 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9). In brief, the charge has to be
written, signed, and verified, as well as contain information "sufficiently precise to identify the
parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1601.12(b)). Some circuits would also inquire into whether a plaintiff manifested "an intent to
activate the administrative process." id. (citing Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 131920(1lth Cir.2001)). Next, the plaintiff must make sure that he or she includes all of the facts in the
charge that may subsequently serve as a basis for his federal lawsuit. With respect to the plaintiff's
ADA lawsuit, a federal court would have subject matter jurisdiction only "over all allegations of
discrimination that either 'fell within the scope of the EEOC's actual investigation or an EEOC
investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination."'
Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't,
276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The court will inquire into whether the
plaintiffs disability claim was encompassed in the plaintiff's EEOC charge, specifically confirming
whether the ADA claim is "unquestionably 'like or reasonably related to"' the allegations of
discrimination in the EEOC charge. Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.
2000). Third, the plaintiffmust make sure he or she files the appropriate notice in a timely manner.
The plaintiff would be required to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged
unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(l). However, if the plaintiff chose to
originally file with a state or local agency, which also has the authority to grant relief, then he or she
may file his claim with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Id. For ADA
claims, as soon as a plaintiff knows of his or her injury, or should reasonably know, the statute of
limitations begins to run the cause of action. Gupta v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 462 F. Supp. 2d
56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Stewart v. District of Columbia, No. Civ.A. 04-1444 CKK, 2006 WL
626921, at **3-4 (D.D.C. 2006)). If the plaintiff does not receive relief from the EEOC, the EEOC
will issue a right-to-sue letter, at which time he or she would have 90 days to file a civil action. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(1).
115. See, e.g., McPherson v. O'Reilly Auto., Inc., 491 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2007); Jenkins v.
Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007); Thompson v. Henderson, 226 F. App'x 466,
471 (6th Cir. 2007); Boone v. Rumsfeld, 172 F. App'x 268, 271 (11th Cir. 2006); MacKenzie, 414
F.3d at 1274; Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2005); Burke v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 142 F. App'x 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2005); Gaul v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d
576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). An additional preliminary requirement of a plaintiffs claim is that the
employer is a "covered entity" under the terms of the ADA. "The term 'covered entity' means an
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42
U.S.C. § 12111(2). The term "employer" is in turn defined as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 1211 I(5)(A).
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ushered in as the dawn of a new era for the disabled, disabled employees
have consistently been disappointed by the courts' administration of
relief under the ADA. One study that reviewed all ADA decisions
between the date on which the ADA became effective in 1992 through
July 1998 found that the defendant-employer prevailed in approximately
ninety-three percent of cases at the trial court level and in ninety-four
percent of decisions at the appellate court stage. 1 6 And the ADA's
protection of disabled employees is not improving with time. On the
contrary, a survey of ADA decisions taken in 2003 determined that the
defendant-employer prevailed in approximately ninety-seven percent of
ADA decisions. 117
The majority of employer victories are won on summary
judgment. 1 8 According to the Commission on Mental and Physical
Disability Law, "employees are treated unfairly under the Act due to
myriad legal technicalities that more often than not prevent the issue of
employment discrimination from ever being considered on the merits by
an administrative or judicial tribunal."1 19 One aspect of the legal
technicalities contributing to the overwhelming rate of failure for ADA
plaintiffs is grounded in the conceptual difficulties inherent in the dual
requirement that a plaintiff be "disabled" and "qualified." 120 These
conceptual difficulties create an unenviable "Catch-22" dilemma for
many ADA plaintiffs. 12 1 On one hand, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that he or she is a "qualified individual," or capable of performing the

116. Ruth Colker, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall For Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999).
117. Amy L. Allbright, 2003 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I - Survey Update,
28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 319, 319 (2004).
118. Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, Study Finds Employers Win Most
ADA Title I JudicialAdministrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403,
403 tbl.1 (1998).
119. Id. at 404.
120. Id. at407.
121. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir. 2004);
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 24 (1st Cir. 2002). See also, Garrett v. Univ.
of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustess, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2005), affd, 507
F.3d 1306 (1 1th Cir. 2007). One author concluded that the dilemma rests not in Congress's choice
of words, but rather in the courts' restrictive construction of the ADA's language. Judith J.
Johnson, Rescue the Americans with DisabilitiesAct from Restrictive Interpretations:Alcoholism as
an Illustration, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 169, 174 (2007). Specifically, the author argues that courts
have interpreted "substantially limited" so restrictively that it is virtually impossible to still perform
one's job and also be disabled. Id. Due to the excessively restrictive interpretation, "[t]he class of
disabled people today is virtually limited to people who are completely blind, deaf, or in a
wheelchair because, in essence, they are totally limited in a major life activity." Id.
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essential functions of his job.122 On the other hand, the claimant must
demonstrate that he or she is disabled, or substantially limited in
performing a major life activity. 23 If the claimant succeeds in showing
that he or she is substantially limited in performing a major life activity
(especially if that activity is working), the claimant may not be able to
simultaneously show that he or she is not a "qualified individual,"
thereby excluding the plaintiff from coverage under the ADA.1 24 As one
author noted, "[e]mployers are more frequently using this dilemma to
their advantage, arguing both that a plaintiff
is not disabled, and that she
' 125
is so disabled that she is not qualified."
Another important piece of the tremendous burden on ADA
plaintiffs is the excessively restrictive definition of the term "disability."
According to the Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law,
the driving reason why very few employee-plaintiffs ever have the
opportunity to argue their cases before a jury of their peers is that the
definition of "disability" is too restrictive.1 26 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly endorsed a stringent interpretation of the term "disability,"
which has further raised the bar for ADA claimants to prevail. 127 Even
certain states seem to disagree with the stringent approach adopted by
many of the federal courts under the ADA, enacting their own disability
discrimination laws that provide broader protection. 28 The statistics

122. Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, supra note 118, at 405.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of
Disability Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 127 (1997).
126. Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, supra note 118, at 405.
127. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002) (stating that the
terms of the ADA, such as "major life activities," "need to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
483-87 (1999) (noting that because Congress cited to 43 million disabled individuals in the United
States when there were in fact many more than that is evidence that Congress intended to limit the
number of individuals who could qualify as disabled under the ADA).
128. E.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 424 F.3d 1060, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted) (recognizing the notable distinction between the definition of disability under California's
disability statute and that of the ADA). Most notably, California's statute requires that one's
impairment must only "limit" a major life activity rather than "substantially limit" a major life
activity, as required under the ADA. Id. (citations omitted). The California legislature expressly
stated that it distinguished its legislation from that of the ADA "to result in broader coverage under
the law of this state than under that federal act." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926.1(c) (West 2005)
State legislators recognized that California's legislation "contains broad definitions of physical
disability, mental disability, and medical condition." Id. § 12926.1(b). Although the federal
statute's definition of disability is the focus of this Comment, individuals suffering with Internet
addiction may be more likely to show that they are disabled with a state law cause of action.
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alone, as cited above, 129 speak for themselves; individuals have an
excruciatingly difficult burden in showing a court that they are disabled
under the ADA. It was this burden that prompted Congress to enact the
ADAAA, as Congress concluded that such a high standard for proving
that one is disabled was "inconsistent with [the] congressional intent"
embodied in the ADA. 130 Of course, years may pass before the impact
of the ADAAA actually manifests itself in the courts.
The requirement to show that one is disabled under the ADA
highlights one notable distinction between the ADA and other civil
rights statutes. Under other civil rights statutes, the plaintiff need not
prove that he or she is a member of a protected class in order to proceed
with his or her cause of action. 131 For example, under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, both male and female plaintiffs are qualified to
sue for gender discrimination. 32 Also, both black and white plaintiffs
are qualified to sue for racial discrimination.1 33 In such lawsuits,
therefore, the trier of fact can focus on the employer's discriminatory
motives and conduct. 134 However, under the ADA, the plaintiffs
obligation to satisfy the court that he or she is a member of the relevant
protected class is in itself such a heavy burden that the courts rarely
135
reach the stage of examining the employer's discriminatory conduct.
The purpose of this Comment is to solely examine this showing that the
ADA plaintiff must make, which constitutes only one of three elements
of the plaintiff s primafacie case. Despite this arguably insurmountable
threshold laid out by the ADA and the courts, this Section will seek to
navigate through this definition and evaluate how a plaintiff with an
Internet addiction may qualify as "disabled" under the ADA.
A. Internet Addiction-Impairment
Under the ADA, there are three ways in which a plaintiff can

129. See supra notes 116-14 and accompanying text.
130. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(8) (2008).
131. Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities,
Illness and ParentingResponsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 221

(1997) (comparing the class of people protected under the ADA to those protected under federal
race and sex antidiscrimination law).
132. Seeid.
133. See id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (allowing two
white men claiming "reverse" discrimination after being fired for an offense that a black co-worker
was not similarly disciplined for to sue under Title VI1)).
134. E.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 278-86.
135. See Colker, supra note 116, at 103 n.24.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
440

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 25:419

qualify as "disabled" on the basis of an Internet addiction: The ADA
defines the term "disability" as: (1) "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual"; (2) "a record of such an impairment"; or (3) "being regarded
as having such an impairment. ' 36 In order for the plaintiff to qualify as
disabled under any one of these three definitions, the plaintiff must first
1' 37
show that his or her Internet addiction constitutes an "impairment."
This threshold showing is crucial in order for the plaintiff to avoid
summary judgment since the question of whether his or her Internet
addiction constitutes an impairment is a question of law for the court.'3 8
The good news for a plaintiff is that Internet addiction is not
expressly excluded under the current statutory framework of the ADA.
Demonstrating that the plaintiffs Internet addiction is an impairment
will require the plaintiff to show that his or her condition "satisfies the
statutory and regulatory definition of a[n] ... impairment. 1 39 The ADA
40
does not directly define the term mental or physical impairment.
However, the Supreme Court has observed that Congress adopted "a
specific statutory provision in the ADA" for the term "impairment,"
which states the following: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser

136. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
137. See id.
138. Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir.
1999) ("[W]hether a claimed affliction constitutes an impairment under the ADA and whether the
identified endeavor constitutes a major life activity are determinations of law for the court to
decide." (citing Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998)).
139. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631, 637 (requiring and holding that the plaintiff-employee's HIV
infection constituted an impairment).
140. Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The term 'mental
impairment' is not defined in the ADA." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000))); Betts v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., No. 97-1850, 1999 WL 739415, at *6 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 1999)
(unpublished table decision) ("[T]he term 'impairment' is not defined in the ADA."), affd, 145 F.
App'x 7 (4th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has identified two sources of guidance in interpreting
the ADA's definition of "disability"-the regulations issued by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare ("HEW") under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the regulations issued
by the EEOC under the ADA. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2001).
The Supreme Court gives significant deference to HEW's regulations because "Congress drew the
ADA's definition of disability almost verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped individual' in
the Rehabilitation Act." Id. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he HEW regulations are of
particular significance because at the time they were issued, HEW was the agency responsible for
coordinating the implementation and enforcement of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act . . .
prohibit[ing] discrimination against individuals with disabilities by recipients of federal financial
assistance." Id. at 195 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632). Although no one agency has the singular
authority to issue regulations interpreting the term "disability" under the ADA, the EEOC has done
so and courts routinely defer to those regulations. See id. at 194 (citations omitted).
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standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation
Act ...

or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such

title.", 4 '
In other words, the ADA's statutory definition of "impairment"
essentially incorporates the regulations issued by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare 142 ("HEW") in interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act, as ultimately does the EEOC, which has adopted
verbatim HEW's definition of "impairment."' 143 Federal courts routinely
defer to the definition of the term "impairment" as articulated in the
EEOC's regulations.1 44 Therefore, to expressly fall within the scope of
the ADA's "statutory and regulatory definition" of "impairment," a
plaintiffs Internet addiction would have to qualify as one of the
following:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
141. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631-32 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000)).
142. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was created in 1953, but when the
Department of Education was created in 1980, HEW was redesignated as the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services.
I STEVEN W. FELDMAN, WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE § 150 (4th ed. 2002).
143. Walker v. City of Vicksburg, Miss., No. 5:06cv60-DCB-JMR, 2007 WL 3245169, at *6
n.6 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2007) ("[T]his Court ... takes notice of the fact that the EEOC regulation
defining 'physical or mental impairment' reads verbatim with the HEW regulation defining the
same terms under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.").
144. See Delgado v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 485 F. Supp. 2d 453, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (citing Ryan v. Grac & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Staten
Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Under the law of this Circuit, the EEOC's
regulations are entitled to 'great deference' in interpreting the ADA.") (quoting Muller v. Costello,
187 F.3d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has noted that the EEOC regulations "while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 14142 (1976)). However, the Supreme Court has questioned the level of deference owed to the
EEOC's regulations regarding definitions in the ADA; nonetheless, courts routinely defer to those
regulations. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 762 n.7 (3d Cir.
2004) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has not decided
whether the EEOC regulations are reasonable or are entitled to deference, although in several cases
it has assumed that they are." EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 801 n.4 (9th Cit.
2002) (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 194).
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emotional or mental illness, and specific
organic brain syndrome,
145

learning disabilities.

The ADA regulations clearly do not explicitly specify Internet

addiction as an impairment. Nonetheless, the regulations' list of
impairments was "not meant as a comprehensive enumeration" of
of
impairments, but merely as a "representative list of disorders
146
conditions" that may qualify as mental or physical impairments.

In other words, the definition of the term "impairment" can be
construed broadly. 147 Consequently, a plaintiffs Internet addiction
could arguably fall under the broad definition of "impairment." In many

instances, courts have recognized conditions as impairments even
though they clearly fall outside the express language of the regulations.
For example, in Coons v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of

Treasury,148 the Ninth Circuit recognized a variety of mental and
physical impairments as cognizable under the ADA, including
"abdominal distress, palpitations, heart pounding, chest pain, depression
and panic disorder."' 149 Also, in Williams v. Stark County Board of
County Commissioners, 150 the Sixth Circuit recognized hypertension and
migraine headaches as impairments.' 5' A plaintiffs Internet addiction
could arguably fall within the scope of the broad designation "[a]ny
One suffering from bipolar
mental or psychological disorder."'' 52
disorder, 153 depression,1 54 Attention Deficit Disorder,155 or posttraumatic stress disorder 56 would similarly be unable to point to the
language of the ADA or its regulations to support an argument that such
conditions constitute impairments under the ADA, yet federal courts

145. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2007). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(A)-(B).
146. Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633); see also 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, § 84.61(3) at 345 (2007).
147. Constance v. Pepsi Bottling Co. of N.Y., No. 03-CV-5009, 2007 WL 2460688, at *29
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2007); Bourbeau v. City of Chicopee, 445 F. Supp. 2d 106, 120 (D. Mass.
2006) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2006)); Cella v. Villanova Univ., No. CIV.A. 01-7181, 2003
WL 329147, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (2001).
148. 383 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004).
149. Id. at 885.
150. 7 F. App'x. 441 (6th Cir. 2001).
151. Id. at 446-47.
152. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(i)).
153. Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 152 (3d Cir. 1999).
154. Hatzakos v. Acme Am. Refrigeration, Inc., No. 03-CV-5428, 2007 WL 2020182, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007).
155. Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprentice Comm., 370 F.3d 763, 769 (8th
Cir. 2004).
156. Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 283 (4th Cir. 2004).
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have held 157
that each one of these conditions can constitute an
impairment.

The EEOC has additionally acted at times to prevent the term
"impairment" from being stretched beyond its intended boundaries. For
example, the EEOC has taken precautions to ensure that certain
conditions, although limiting in some manner, cannot qualify as
impairments under the ADA. 158 The EEOC has taken the position that
the following conditions or characteristics are not impairments: (1)
"environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages" (e.g., poverty,
lack of education); (2) "homosexuality and bisexuality"; (3)
"pregnancy"; (4) "physical characteristics" (e.g., eye color, hair color,
left-handedness); (5) "common personality traits" (e.g., poor judgment, a
quick temper); and (6) "normal deviations in height, weight, 16or0
strength." 159 For example, in Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

the Eighth Circuit denied a plaintiffs claim that he was disabled on the
basis of his emotional instability. 161 In Watson v. City of Miami
Beach, 162 the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiffs "serious personality
63
conflicts" with co-workers did not rise to the level of an impairment.1
Furthermore, the ADA itself explicitly excludes certain conditions
from qualifying as impairments.164
Transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, many gender-identity disorders
not resulting from physical impairments, other sexual behavioral
disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and
psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from65 current illegal drug
use cannot constitute impairments under the ADA.
157. See Taylor, 174 F.3d at 152; Jacques v. Dimarzio, 386 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2004);
Hatzakos, 2007 WL 2020182, at *5.
158. 29 C.F.R. pt.1630, app. § 1630.2(h) ("It is important to distinguish between conditions

that are impairments and physical, psychological,
characteristics that are not impairments.").

environmental, cultural and economic

159. Id.; EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY:
COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 902, DEFINITION OF THE TERM "DISABILITY," available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902sum.html (last visited May 14, 2008).
160. 344 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at 822 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h)).
162. 177 F.3d 932 (11 th Cir. 1999).

163. Id. at 935.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2000).
165. Id. Like Internet addiction, compulsive gambling is a process addiction. Although the
APA has recognized compulsive gambling as a disorder, plaintiffs are automatically precluded from
seeking relief for employment discrimination under the ADA where the underlying disability is an
addiction to gambling as a result of the ADA's exclusions. See, e.g., Labit v. Akzo-Nobel Salt, Inc.,
No. 99-30047, 2000 WL 284015, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000) (per curiam) (denying plaintiffs
compulsive gambling disorder as a disability in light of Congress's express exclusion of compulsive
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The bad news for plaintiffs is the lack of authority affirmatively
recognizing Internet addiction as a distinct impairment. As a mental
impairment, the ultimate recognition would ideally come from the APA
in the DSM. 166 The DSM "is cited regularly by judges in various
contexts," including in evaluating whether a condition constitutes an
impairment under the ADA. 167 As noted by legislators in discussing the
appropriate scope of the definition of "disability" under the ADA,
"[w]hen psychiatrists talk of mental disorders they mean the kinds of
disorders categorized [in the DSM]. And when psychiatrists testify about
the disorders categorized here, judges-who are charged by law with
determining what is or is not a 'mental impairment'-listen to the
psychiatrists." 168 Therefore, the DSM's current failure to recognize
Internet addiction as a distinct disorder is likely to give judges pause in
ruling that a plaintiffs Internet addiction is an impairment under the
ADA.
Nonetheless, the DSM's omission of Internet addiction is not
conclusive. In enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that "[t]he fact
that a 'condition' does not appear in DSM does not mean that such
condition is not a mental disorder." 169 The DSM itself notes that its
"diagnostic criteria" and "classification of mental disorders reflect a
consensus of current formulations of evolving knowledge in our field but
do not encompass all the conditions that may be legitimate objects of
treatment or research efforts." 170 Furthermore, the DSM's omission of
Internet addiction is not surprising given that the current version was
issued in 2000.171 Therefore, at the time the APA was conducting the
research in preparation for the 2000 edition, the Internet was still in its
nascent stages and problems associated with excessive Internet use were
barely beginning to manifest themselves. Also, "[p]sychiatrists are not
the only persons who can define a mental disorder; judges do it all the

gambling in the ADA (citing § 12211 (b)(2))).
166. See 135 CONG. REc. 20,572 (1989) (Statement of Sen. Armstrong) ("A private entity that
wishes to know what [the ADA] might mean with respect to mental impairments would do well to
turn to [the DSM] .... "); Shute, supra note 45, at 61 (referring to the fourth edition of the DSM as
"the bible of mental health care").
167. 135 CONG. REC. 20,572 (1989) (Statement of Senator Armstrong) (citations omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-111-R xxix (3d ed., rev. 1987)).
171.

AM.

PSYCHIATRIC

ASS'N,

DIAGNOSTIC AND

STATISTICAL

MANUAL

OF MENTAL

DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
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time."' 72 While Internet addiction research may be incomplete, a
plaintiff likely has numerous experts available who would testify and
present evidence of Internet addiction's qualification as a distinct
disorder and an impairment, at least in the case of that particular
individual. Nonetheless, the lack of recognition of Internet addiction by
the APA and the courts creates additional work for plaintiffs. Of course,
there is growing speculation that the APA will include some form of
Internet addiction in its next addition to be released in 2012, which
would considerably bolster the plaintiff's case.
Another possibly ominous fact for a plaintiff is Congress' exclusion
of compulsive gambling as a disability. As discussed above, many
researchers view compulsive gambling as the most analogous behavioral
addiction to Internet addiction. 7 3 Therefore, Congress' treatment of
compulsive gambling under the ADA may be a portent of Congress'
treatment of Internet addiction in the future. At the same time, the
ADA's legislative history fails to reveal the basis on which Congress
excluded compulsive gambling as a disability. According to Senator
Armstrong, who promoted the explicit exclusions mentioned above, the
exclusions were based on the fear that the private sector of the courts
would be "swamped with mental disability litigation," and by excluding
compulsive gambling and others, Congress would remove "some of the
mental disorders that would have created the more egregious
lawsuits."'' 7 4 Beyond this concern, it is not entirely clear the exact nature
of compulsive gambling that prompted Congress to exclude that
condition and how and if that would carry over to an exclusion of
Internet addiction. Moreover, Senator Armstrong's amendment was
intended to be "narrow" and it is uncertain if Congress would expand the
current exclusions to incorporate Internet addiction. 175 Furthermore,
other researchers have decided to not use compulsive gambling as the
model for Internet addiction, but rather other variations of an impulse
control disorder. 76 The DSM contains other impulse control disorders
that are not excluded by Congress (e.g., intermittent explosive
disorder, 177 trichotillomania, 178 and impulse-control disorder not

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

135 CONG. REC. 20,572 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
135 CONG. REC. 20,574 (1989).

Id.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
DSM-IV,supra note 171 § 312.34, at 667.
Id. Trichotillomania is an impulse control disorder that is primarily characterized by "the

recurrent pulling out of one's own hair that results in noticeable hair loss." Id. § 312.39, at 674, §
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Nonetheless, the possibility is there that a court

could rule against Internet addiction as an impairment on the basis of the
compulsive gambling exclusion.
A plaintiff could attempt to bolster his or her case by drawing the
court's attention to the ordinary meaning of the term impairment. For
instance, in light of Webster's dictionary's definition of "impairment" as
a "decrease in strength, value, amount, or quality,"' 80 the Fourth Circuit
held that an employee's deficiencies in his short-term memory and
reading skills constituted a mental impairment. 181 Likewise, a plaintiff
could show that studies have found those suffering from various forms
of Internet addiction experience numerous symptoms that adversely
impact their strength, value, amount, or quality of their work and other
activities. 82 For example, Internet addicts spend an inordinate amount
of time on the Internet, in many cases at a great cost. In one case, for
example, a stay-at-home mother who described herself as being
"computer illiterate" when she first started learning about Internet chat
rooms developed such a compulsion for the Internet that "within only
three months, she was spending between fifty and sixty hours a week [on
the Internet,] sacrificing household chores, family time and social
activities."' 83 Such behavior certainly falls within the scope of the
ordinary, dictionary meaning of "impairment."
In sum, under the ADA's current form, a plaintiff is not excluded
from submitting Internet addiction as an impairment. There is some
uncertainty disfavoring the plaintiff with the DSM's omission of Internet
addiction and Congress' exclusion of the similar disorder of compulsive
gambling. Nonetheless, when a judge weighs the ever-growing body of
evidence that Internet addiction is a serious disorder and does so in
connection with complying with the ADAAA's mandate to construe the
term "disability" "in favor of broad coverage of individuals under [the
312.30, at 677.
179. Id. § 312.39, at 674-677, § 312.30, at 677. An impulse control disorder not other
specified refers to "disorders of impulse control (e.g., skin picking) that do not meet the criteria for
any specific Impulse-Control Disorder or for another mental disorder having features involving
impulse control described elsewhere in the manual (e.g., Substance Dependence, a Paraphilia)." Id.
§ 312.30, at 677.
180. WEBSTER'S I1NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 612 (1988).
181. Betts v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., No. 97-1850, 1999 WL 739415, at *1, *6 (4th
Cir. Sept. 22, 1999) (unpublished table decision) (citations omitted), affd, 145 F. App'x 7 (4th Cir.
2005).
182. See Chou, Condron, & Belland, supra note 11, at 369 (listing "failure to manage time,
missed sleep, [and] missed meals" as some of the problems associated with compulsive Internet use
according to one study) (referencing Brenner, supra note 12, at 881 .).
183. Liu & Potenza, supra note 37.
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ADA], to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the ADA],"'184
a judge may very well be persuaded that a plaintiff's Internet addiction
constitutes an "impairment."
B. Major Life Activity
Even if a court accepts Internet addiction as an impairment,
"[m]erely having an impairment does not make one disabled for
purposes of the ADA." 185 A plaintiff must further show that this
impairment adversely impacts a "major life activity.' 8 6 In this context,
the term "'[m]ajor' . . . means important;" in other words, Internet

addiction must adversely affect an '1activity
"that [is] of central
87
life."
daily
plaintiffs]
[the
to
importance
The EEOC has enumerated a number of life activities that it
considers to be "major" for purposes of the ADA. The ADA regulations
expressly define "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." 188 The EEOC has also noted that
"[t]his list is not exhaustive. For example, other major life activities
' 89
include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching."'
Also, the EEOC's Compliance Manual identifies "learning, thinking,
concentrating, interacting with others, caring for oneself, speaking,
performing manual tasks . . . working [, and s]leeping" as major life

activities.190 The EEOC and many federal courts have deemed these
activities to constitute "basic activit[ies] that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty."' 9' In the
ADAAA, Congress also provided an illustrative list of major life
activities, including caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
92
and working. 1

184. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(4)(A) (2008).
185. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002).
186. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
187. Id. at 197 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1363 (1976)).
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007).
189. Id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i).
190. EEOC, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with
Disabilities
Act
and
Psychiatric
Disabilities
pt.
3
(1997),
available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance].
191. Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999).
192. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(2)(A) (2008).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
448

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 25:419

Fortunately, for a plaintiff suffering from Internet addiction,
research shows that "[p]roblematic Internet use not only consumes time,
but also disrupts major areas of life functioning."'' 93 While Internet
addiction is unlikely to impact activities such as seeing, hearing, or
reaching, such a condition, if serious enough, might impact a plaintiff's
ability 94to sleep, to interact with others, to concentrate/think, or to
work. 1
1. Major Life Activities Unrelated to Work Generally
It should be noted that although a plaintiffs employment is
terminated for his or her Internet activities at work, the major life
activity that is the basis of the plaintiffs claim need not be related to
work or working itself. While working itself can be a major life activity,
there are numerous other major life activities, and there is no
"requirement that limitations on other life activities-walking, for
example-be shown to manifest specifically in the workplace before the
plaintiff may be accorded disabled status under the statute. ' 95 For
example, a plaintiff may allege that his or her addiction adversely affects
his or her ability to interact with others, but that difficulty need not
necessarily manifest itself in the form of the plaintiffs inability to
successfully interact with co-workers. In fact, it is in the plaintiffs best
interest to rely upon major life activities other than working to support a
disability claim. The Supreme Court has embraced the EEOC's own
reluctance to characterize working as a major life activity, agreeing that
"working [is to] be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last
resort, only '[i]f an individual is96not substantially limited with respect to
any other major life activity."1
2. Sleeping
Research demonstrates that sleep deprivation is a common

193. Liu & Potenza, supra note 37 (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
In Davidson, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the plaintiff was not
disabled since she failed to show how her learning impairment "interfere[d] with her ability to learn
in the workplace," even though the plaintiff had produced evidence of her learning impairment
through her secondary and post-secondary education. Id. at 502, 508.
196. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,
app. § 1630.20) (1998)).
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symptom of Internet addiction.1 97 In one study, which was based upon
563 responses to an online study conducted across twenty-five countries,
forty percent of respondents reported that on more than one occasion,
they had obtained less than four hours of sleep in a night because of
"non-essential Internet use."'1 98 In another study, many of the subjects
reported staying up until one, two, three, or four o'clock in the morning
to engage in their Internet activities.'" As one subject described his
preference for late-nights on the Internet, "I believe that the Internet
belongs to the night. The deeper the night, the prettier the Internet ...I

enjoy the quietness of the surroundings, while the hustles and bustles on
the net are about to start .

,,200 The fatigue that Internet addicts

experience due to sleeplessness may in turn contribute to employee
errors, mishaps, and injuries in the workplace. °1
3. Interacting with Others
Internet addiction may adversely influence a plaintiffs ability to
interact with others. Research has shown that increased Internet use can
result in "statistically significant declines in social involvement ...

and

with increases in loneliness. 20 2 As people use the Internet excessively,
whether for viewing pornography or talking in chat rooms, they displace
time that would otherwise be available for social interaction and spend
increasing amounts of time alone.20 3 The time spent on the Internet can
result in the erosion or complete loss of "strong ties," or those
"relationships [characterized by] frequent contact, deep feelings of
20 4
affection and obligation, and application to a broad content domain.,
Case studies have demonstrated the destructive impact that Internet
addictions can have on all forms of intimate relationships-"marriages,
20 5
dating relationships, parent-child relationships, and close friendships.,
Dr. Kimberly Young concluded from one study on Internet use that
those exhibiting symptoms of Internet addiction progressively spent
more time alone in front of a computer, sacrificing time with their
197.

Liu & Potenza, supra note 37.

198. Id.
199. Chou, supra note 40, at 581.
200.

Id.

201.

Adkisson, supra note 10, at 111.

202. Robert Kraut et al., Internet Paradox: A Social Technology That Reduces Social
Involvement and Psychological Well-Being? 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1017, 1028 (1998).

203. See id. at 1019.
204. See id. at 1019, 1029-30.
205. Young, supra note 12, at 241.
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relatives and friends. 206 Those individuals further alienate loved ones by
reacting angrily or resentfully towards anyone who questions their
Internet use or tries to take them away from the Internet.20 7
4. Concentrating/Thinking
Internet addiction may inhibit a plaintiffs ability to concentrate or
think. Studies of individuals suffering from forms of Internet addiction
have shown that Internet addiction is "associated with significant
distress and functional impairment,, 20 8 including adverse effects on
concentration.20 9
A combination of physical and psychological
consequences of an Internet addiction, such as fatigue, sleep deprivation,
blurred vision, and body pain or discomfort have been determined to
make "disruptions of daily routines" common occurrences for people
afflicted with Internet addictions. 2 10 After one young female student's
GPA dropped from 3.5 to 1.8, she decided to give up the Internet, but
described her efforts by stating the following:
After three days off-line, I couldn't stop thinking about all my Net
friends... I couldn't concentrate on reading, studying for tests, doing
homework. I felt terrible, just like a smoker who has gone all day
without smoking. I needed my Internet fix. That's when I knew I had a
problem. I learned
how powerful this addiction is and that I needed
21
help with it.

1

5. Working
Case studies have also demonstrated the adverse impact that
In one case study,
Internet addiction may have on the ability to work.
a married forty-seven year-old computer consultant claimed to spend

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Shapira et al., supra note 43, at 208.
Adkisson, supranote 10, at 111.
Liu & Potenza, supra note 37.
KIMBERLY S. YOUNG, CAUGHT IN THE NET:

How

TO RECOGNIZE THE SIGNS OF INTERNET

ADDICTION-AND A WINNING STRATEGY FOR RECOVERY 55 (1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
212. Dan J. Stein et al., HypersexualDisorderand Preoccupationwith Internet Pornography,
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1590, 1593 (2001) ("[T]he consequences of [excessive Internet use are] far
reaching, with many subjects going without sleep, being late for work, ignoring family obligations,
and suffering financial and legal consequences.").
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twelve "recreational" hours a day on the Internet during the work week
and as many as eighteen hours a day on the weekend. 1 3 He lost many
jobs due to his inappropriate computer use. 2 "4 A study conducted over a
three-year period of students in Taiwan also found that the subjects
reported poor grades, failed courses, and job losses as consequences.2 15
For example, one subject stated,
I was addicted to MUDs at that time [an online interactive game]. I
knew I had to take [a] final exam the next morning, but I could not
stop playing MUD until 6 o'clock. Then I decided not to take the
exam. I announced this decision in the MUD; all players in it
applauded me ... [a]t that time, I thought I was a tragic hero .... 216

In line with the core indices of an addiction or impulse control
disorder, 21 7 Internet addicts persist in their Internet use despite negative
consequences in their life, such as problems with studies and
employment.
6. Non-statutory or Regulatory-defined Major Life Activities
Furthermore, a plaintiff is not entirely constrained by the ADA or
the accompanying regulations in the proposal of what constitutes "major
life activities" that are negatively impacted by Internet addiction. 21 8 If a

plaintiff alleges that one of the plaintiffs life activities is adversely
affected by his or her condition, and such activity has not been
designated as a "major life activity" by the EEOC or the specific circuit
in which the plaintiff is bringing the cause of action, then the court will
begin its analysis with the EEOC's illustrative list of "major life
activities. ' 21 9 The court will then employ a "'comparative importance'
standard" by which the court will evaluate whether the activity proposed
by the plaintiff is "of comparable significance as an enumerated major

213.
214.
215.

Black, Belsare, & Schlosser, supra note 38, at 842.
Id.
Chou, supra note 40, at 575, 581.

216. Id. at 581 (internal quotation marks omitted).
217. Shapira et al., supra note 43, at 209-10 (describing the efforts of several studies to classify
problematic Internet usage through models based on DSM-IV criteria for substance dependence and
impulse control disorders).
218.

See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1001-03 (9th Cir. 2007) cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 879 (2008) (citations omitted) (noting that the enumerated major life activities in the
regulations comprise an "illustrative list" while examining a limitation to a non-enumerated activity
claimed as a protected disability by the plaintiff).
219.

Id. at 1002 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998)).
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' 22 °

A plaintiff might allege that driving is a major life activity that is
adversely affected by the plaintiffs Internet addiction. The court would
ask whether driving is just as significant to one's life as is learning or
walking. 22 1 The court may note, however, that millions of Americans do
not drive, yet they live healthy, normal lives. 22 As such, it is highly
unlikely that being deprived of the ability to drive oneself to work or
some other destination can "sensibly be compared to inability to see or
to learn., 223 This was part of the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in
rejecting driving as a major life activity, noting that driving is
"'conspicuously different in character from the activities that are listed"
in the EEOC's regulations.22 4
In light of the foregoing research and case studies, a plaintiff
certainly may be able to point to one or more major life activities that are
adversely affected by his or her Internet addiction.
C. SubstantialLimitation
Upon showing that the plaintiffs Internet addiction adversely
affects one or more major life activities, a plaintiff must still show that
the limiting effect of his or her condition is of a sufficient degree to
constitute a disability. 225 If the plaintiffs Internet addiction only mildly
limits a major life activity, or if the limiting effects of the Internet
addiction are otherwise temporary or sporadic, the plaintiff will not
succeed in showing that he or she is disabled.22 6 The "linchpin" of the
220. Id. (quoting Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638).
221. See Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998)) (comparing driving to major life activities listed in the quoted EEOC
regulation, including walking and learning).
222. See id. at 1329-30 ("[Mlillions of Americans do not drive ... and deprivation of being
self-driven to work cannot be sensibly compared to inability to see or learn." (citing Anderson v.
N.D. State Hosp., 232 F.3d 634, 636 (8th Cir. 2000); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158
F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998))).
223. Id. at 1330 (citing Anderson, 232 F.2d at 636; Colwell, 158 F.3d at 643).
224. Id. at 1329-30 (citations omitted).
225. See Section 902 Definition of the Term Disability, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) §
902.4(c)(1) (1995), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html [hereinafter EEOC
Definition of Disability] ("To rise to the level of a [protected] disability, an impairment must
significantly restrict an individual's major life activities. Impairments that result in only mild
limitations are not disabilities.").
226. See Heiko v. Colombo Say. Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted)
("Sporadic or otherwise temporary impairments do not qualify as substantial limitations."); Kelly v.
Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 106-08 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (concluding plaintiffs
impairment limiting his ability to walk did not rise to the level of a protected disability, analogizing
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plaintiff s primafaciecase will be that his or her addiction "substantially
limits" a major life activity.227 Important policy considerations underlie
this substantial limitation requirement, as "[w]ithout it, the ADA would
cover any minor impairment that might tangentially affect major life
activities such as breathing, eating, and walking. 2 28
Under the ADA, Internet addiction must "substantially limit" a
major life activity. In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams,229 the Supreme Court concluded that to be substantially
limited in a major life activity, an "individual must have an impairment
that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. 2 3 ° Similarly,
the EEOC's current regulations define the term "substantially limits" as
"significantly restricted. 2 3
By enacting the ADAAA, Congress
rejected the high standard that the Supreme Court and EEOC had created
for plaintiffs to successfully show that their impairment "substantially
limits" a major life activity.2 32 Congress determined that the Supreme
Court and EEOC's definition of "substantially limits" was "inconsistent
2 33
with congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard.,
Although Congress declared that an impairment need not "severely" or
"significantly" restrict a major life activity, Congress failed to clarify in
the ADAAA how restrictive an impairment must be to substantially limit
a major life activity. Congress simply concluded that the EEOC must
revise its regulations to define "substantially limits" in a manner
consistent with the findings and purposes of the ADA.234
Despite the ambiguity recently created by the ADAAA over the
meaning of "substantially limits," the EEOC and the courts will
undoubtedly still require a considerable or material restriction in the
condition, manner, or duration in which the plaintiff can perform that
major life activity when compared to the condition, manner, or duration
in which the average member of the general population could perform

it to similar 'mild limitation' case law).
227. Waldrip, 325 F.3d at 655 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000)); see also § 12102(2)(A)
(requiring a substantial limitation of one or more major life activities within the definition of
"disability").
228. Waldrip, 325 F.3d at 655.
229. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
230. Id. at 198.
231.
232.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1).
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(2)-(5) (2008).

233.

Id. § 2(a)(8).

234.

Id. § 2(b)(6), 4.
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that same activity.23 5 The court, in particular, is likely to examine three
aspects of a plaintiffs Internet addiction: "(i)[t]he nature and severity of
[the Internet addiction]; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of [the
Internet addiction]; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from [the
Internet addiction]. 36 All of the evidence must ultimately show that
the plaintiffs Internet addiction restricts ''a237major life activity in a
"considerable" manner or "to a large degree.
1. Severity of the Internet Addiction
The court will examine the nature and severity of the addiction.2 38
A plaintiff's claim will likely fail if his or her Internet addiction rendered
it only a little more difficult than average to perform any of the major
life activities described above.239
a. Sleeping
It would be rather difficult to show that one's Internet addiction
substantially impairs one's ability to sleep. Though research shows that
Internet addiction adversely affects the ability to sleep, 240 getting only a
few hours of sleep a night because one was up all night shopping or
visiting chat rooms will likely fail to meet the necessary standard. Courts
recognize that "difficulty sleeping is extremely widespread., 241 Merely

235. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The House Bill defined "substantially limits" as "materially
restricts." ADA Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2d Sess. 2008). By
"materially restricted," representatives intended that an impairment "less than 'severely restricts,'
and less than 'significantly restricts,' but more serious than a moderate impairment which would be
in the middle of the spectrum." H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 2, at 16 (2008). The House Committee
also decided that under this definition, courts would still examine the condition, manner, and
duration of the limitation on a major life activity. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 10
(2008). However, the House's definition and observations did not make their way into the final bill.
236. § 1630.2()(2) (listing the factors that "should be considered in determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity").
237. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-97 (2002)
("'[S]ubstantially' in the phrase 'substantially limits' suggests 'considerable' or 'to a large degree."'
(citations omitted)).
238. § 1630.2()(2)(i).
239. See, e.g., Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105-08 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)
(concluding plaintiff's impairment limiting his ability to walk did not present a sufficiently difficult
barrier to rise to the level of a protected disability, discussing similar 'mild limitation' case law).
240. See supra text and commentary accompanying notes 194-98.
241. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 1998).
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getting a "tough night's sleep" does not suffice.242 Merely claiming to
get three to four hours of sleep a night, without medical or other
supporting evidence and without a claim that the alleged sleep
deficiency affects one's ability to function throughout the working day
will not suffice.24 3 The Tenth Circuit has refused to treat a plaintiff as
being substantially limited in sleeping who was getting two to three
hours of sleep a night due to his impairment.2 44 Even if a plaintiff were
to testify that he or she receives no sleep on some nights, without
producing medical evidence on the impact of such sleep deprivation on
his or her ability to function daily and without showing that such sleep
deprivation is long-term, the plaintiff may still fail to show that his or
her addiction substantially limits his ability to sleep. 245 Basically, for a
plaintiff to succeed, he or she would have to present evidence that he or
she had virtually gone without any sleep over a significant, sustained
period of time, or at the very least medical evidence that the few hours
that the plaintiff did receive
significantly affected his or her ability to
246
function during the day.

b. Interacting with Others
A plaintiff will also have challenges showing that his or her Internet
addiction substantially limits the plaintiff's ability to interact with others.
The "mere trouble getting along with co-workers is not sufficient to
show a substantial limitation., 247
While research demonstrates

242. See id.
243. Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Head v. Glacier
Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying summary judgment where the plaintiff was
able to sleep five to six hours per night with the help of medication that also made him drowsy
during the day); Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., 432 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[l]nability to
sleep for more than five hours per night is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of
sleeping."); Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2001) ("While less than
five hours sleep is not optimal, it is not significantly restricted in comparison to the average person
in the general population.")).
244. Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 1999).
245. See Taylor v. W. Penn Allegheny Gen. Hosp., No. Civ.A. 04-1564, 2005 WL 311387, at
*5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (2007)) (holding that plaintiff's
affidavit that she had sleepless nights due to her impairment, without any other evidence that the
problem was "severe, long term, or [had] a permanent impact" failed to meet the ADA's standards
to qualify as a substantial limitation to the major life activity of sleeping).
246. See Pack, 166 F.3d at 1306 (citations omitted) (suggesting that showing oneself to be
"completely unable to sleep" may suffice, but concluding that only having episodic challenges of
sleeping two or three hours a night does not meet the ADA's standards).
247. Lanman v. Johnson County, Kan., 393 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Steele
v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001)).
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decreased levels of social interaction and increased levels of social
withdrawal often result from excessive usage of the Internet, 48 a
plaintiff would have to essentially show that his or her Internet addiction
had driven the plaintiff to become an utter social recluse. A few isolated
2 49
incidents of unusual confrontations with co-workers will not suffice.
If the Internet addiction caused him or her to have "severe problems"
interacting with his or her co-workers and others outside of work on a
"regular basis," such as "consistently high levels of hostility, social
withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary," a plaintiff may
win at least at the summary judgment stage. 250 For example, in Head v.
Glacier Northwest Inc.,251 the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had
shown that his impairment substantially limited his ability to interact
with others. 2 As a result of his impairment, the plaintiff (1) "avoid[ed]
crowds, stores, large family gatherings, and even doctor's
appointments"; (2) "would not leave the house most weekends before he
was fired, and after he was fired he would not leave the house for weeks
on end"; and (3) "avoided telephone interaction unless 'there were
serious consequences' for not responding to phone calls. 253 It would be
a rare case to find one's addiction to Internet pornography or gaming to
have driven one into a pattern of such extreme anti-social conduct that
one cannot interact with other humans "at the most basic level of these
activities" ("i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to
them, or to go among other people"). 5 4
c. Thinking/Concentrating
In order to show that his or her Internet addiction substantially
restricts the plaintiffs ability to think or concentrate, a plaintiff would
need to produce evidence that his or her addiction prevents the plaintiff
from functioning not just in his or her daily work tasks, but in life

248. See Kraut et al., supra note 202, at 1028.
249. See Lanman, 393 F.3d at 1153-54, 1158 (finding that plaintiffs failure to interact with coworkers appropriately on numerous occasions during the spring of 2001 failed to show "a pattern of
failure to interact on a regular basis").
250.

Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added)

(quoting McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1999)) (citations)
(denying summary judgment where the plaintiff actively avoided social contact "'most' of the time"
though not "all the time") (citing Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003).

251.
252.
253.

Head v.Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005)
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1060-61.

254.

Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004).
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generally.255 Even if a plaintiff can show that he or she cannot perform
at work effectively because of his or her failure to concentrate or think,
if the court sees that the plaintiff can otherwise regularly drive a car,256
apply average intellect in other aspects of his or her life, 257 or is
"moderately limited only in the ability think and concentrate"
generally, 58 the court will deny the plaintiff's claim.
For example, in Collins v. Prudential Investment & Retirement
Services,259 in denying the plaintiffs allegation that she was
substantially impaired in her ability to think, the court held that the
plaintiffs achievements in various aspects of her life (e.g., holding
multiple jobs, earning academic degrees, performing family, and civic
responsibilities) demonstrated that she was not substantially limited as
alleged.2 60 By contrast, in Head, the plaintiff succeeded in showing that
his mental impairment substantially limited his ability to think because
the plaintiff showed that he
could not stay focused on something for more than brief periods. [That
he] did not have much of a short-term memory at all. [That he] had to
be repeatedly reminded of appointments, or tasks [he] had to do. [That
i]f [he] looked at written material for too long things just got jumbled
in [his] mind and [he] would have to stop. [That he] could not sit and
focus on an entire television show. [And finally, showed that he] quit
school because of [his] inability to focus or concentrate adequately.261
Therefore, the fact that a plaintiff is so consumed by his or her
thoughts to get on the Internet to shop or look at pornography that he or
she merely has to think harder than usual, or take more time than normal
to perform certain tasks,262 or that it makes him or her forget to take care

255. See infra text and commentary accompanying notes 256-61.
256.

Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, 231 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that the

plaintiffs ability to drive a car could be determined to conflict with his position that he was
significantly restricted in his ability to think and learn).
257.

Weisberg v. Riverside Tp. Bd. of Educ., 180 F. App'x 357, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2007)) (finding the fact that the plaintiff ranked in the average or high
range of intellectual ability in cognitive functions other than those claimed to effect his job
precluded finding substantial limitation of ability to learn or think).

258.

Battle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 438 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2006) (dictum) ("[Being]

'moderately limited' in ...

ability to think and concentrate ... is insufficient to establish an ADA-

qualifying disability." (citations omitted)).
259.

119 F. App'x 371 (3d Cir. 2005).

260.

Id. at 376.

261.

Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).

262. See Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying plaintiffs
claim that her depression substantially limited her ability to think or concentrate because she took

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

39

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 25:419

of important responsibilities 263 will not be sufficient. The plaintiff would
have to show a significant increase in the difficulty of performing
normal tasks as well
as the inability to perform a range of basic activities
264
in his or her life.

d. Working
Although the major life activity of working is to be considered only
as a last resort, a plaintiff may try to show that his or her Internet
addiction substantially limits his or her ability to work. To succeed,
however, the plaintiff will have to show that his or her impairment
restricts more than a "single, particular job," but rather that it
"significantly restrict[s the plaintiff] in the ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to
265
the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.,
A plaintiff could allege that he or she is unable to work in a class of
jobs. This would require the plaintiff to show that his or her Internet
addiction precludes her from not only performing in his or her current
job position, but also all "jobs utilizing similar
training, knowledge,
266
skills or abilities, within that geographical area.,
However, "class of jobs" itself is defined broadly. In Murphy v.
United Parcel Service, Inc.,26 7 the relevant "class of jobs" was mechanic
positions, and not merely mechanic positions that involved operating a
commercial motor vehicle.26 8 For example, if a plaintiff were a patient
care nurse who alleged that her back injury substantially limited her
ability to work since she could not lift anything above ten pounds, she
would have to show that her own employer, as well as other employers
in the same geographic area, had no available nursing positions
generally in which she would be able to work with her back injury. 269 It
twice the amount of time to perform tasks or had difficulty making decisions).
263. See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff's

repeated incidents of forgetfulness, which included regular "trouble remembering to take a second
daily dosage of anti-seizure medication," did not rise to the level of a substantial limitation).
264. See Battle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 438 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming a
finding of disability where plaintiff showed that he had to "think[] and concentrate[] at a laborious
rate" to complete his job-related tasks and that he was completely unable to make household or
financial decisions or discipline his children).
265. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2007).
266. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B).
267. 527 U.S. 516(1999).

268.

Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted).

269. See Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 782-83 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted)
(declining to find substantial limitation in the major life activity of working where the plaintiff
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would not be sufficient that there were no other patient care nursing
positions in that geographic area.27 ° Since she had a nursing license, she
would also be able to work in nursing positions that did not require her
to move or directly care for patients.271
If a plaintiff were in a position, for example, such as a website
designer, which required the plaintiff to always be on the Internet, then
the plaintiffs Internet addiction may arguably prevent the plaintiff from
performing his or her job responsibilities as a website designer.
However, the plaintiff would have to show that the skills or training that
he or she applies to perform his or her website designer position could
not carry over to any job in the same geographic area.272 Although
obstructed from performing his or her current or preferred website
designer position, a website designer may still be able to perform a job
using the same technical skills, but which would not require him or her
to be on the Internet, or perhaps not even be directly involved with
working on computers.
One can see how challenging it may be for an Internet addict to
show that his or her addiction prevents him or her from working in a
class of jobs. A showing that a plaintiff is significantly restricted in a
"broad range of jobs" would be an even more sweeping endeavor,
requiring the plaintiff to show that the Internet addiction impairment
prevented him or her from performing in "jobs not utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities within [his or her] geographical
area." 273 Needless to say, showing that one's Internet addiction
substantially limits the ability to work is a challenging burden to satisfy.
2. Duration of the Internet Addiction
For Internet addiction to qualify as a disability, it will be crucial for
the plaintiff to show that his or her addiction is more than a temporary
condition. 274 Even if a plaintiff's impairment is severe, it will fall short
of a disability if it is a mere momentary malady.27 5 However, judges and

failed, inter alia, to "submit[] [any] evidence of the range of jobs available in her geographic area
that would fall within her physical restrictions").
270. See id.at 783.
271. See id. at 783 & n.5.
272. See id.at 782.
273. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i), (ii)(C) (2007) (emphasis added).
274. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii).
275. See Garrett v. Univ. of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 507 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th

Cir. 2007).
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juries alike have virtually no authoritative guidance as to what period of
time a condition must last to constitute a substantial limitation. 76 The
ADA does not speak on the issue nor has the Supreme Court taken a
position on the proper duration of a disability beyond generally holding
that the impairment's limitation must be permanent or long-term.277
Therefore, until the Court "fine-tunes its interpretation, it will be unclear
how lower courts should deal with periods between, say, [six] and
[twenty-four] months. 27 8
It is virtually impossible to articulate a rule as to what length of
time will qualify an impairment as a disability. According to the EEOC,
an impairment that lasts "at least several months" is not short-term. 279
Some courts agree with the EEOC.28" For example, the Sixth Circuit has
held that an employee's hypertension that caused the employee to miss
nearly three months of work could be a substantial limitation.2 81 Some
courts do not agree with the EEOC.28 2 In Huckans v. U.S. Postal
Service,283 the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not claim a

276. See Guzman-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 10 (lst Cir. 2005).
277. See id. See Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. at 198.
278. Guzman-Rosario, 397 F.3d at 10. The ADAAA clarifies that for purposes of "regarded
as" disability discrimination, impairments "that are transitory and minor," meaning impairments
"with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less" cannot be the basis of a disability claim.
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 11 0th Cong. § 4(a)(3)(B) (2008). According to the
ADAAA's express language, this limitation applies only to a "regarded as" disability claim, not an
actual disability claim. See id. at § 4(a)(1).
279. EEOC Definition of Disability, supra note 225, at § 902.04(d).
280. See, e.g., Huckans v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 99-5020, 1999 WL 1079619, at *3 (10th Cir.
Nov. 30, 1999) (unpublished table decision); Williams v. Stark County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 7
F. App'x 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding impairment causing an employee to miss almost three
months of work could be substantial under the ADA); Wood v. County of Alameda, No. C94 1554
TEH, 1995 WL 705139, at *6, 9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 1995) (finding impairment causing an
employee to miss over a year of work was substantial); Pinson v. Berkely Med. Res., Inc., No. 031255, 2005 WL 3210950, at * 8-9 (W.D. Pa. June 25, 2005) (finding episodic impairment where an
employee missed ten days of work in seventeen months could be considered a disability under the
ADA).
281. Williams, F. App'x at 446.
282. See, e.g., Huckans, 1999 WL 1079619, at *3 (finding impairment lasting only three
months of too short duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rousch v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d
840, 842, 844 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding an impairment lasting almost two years of too short duration
to be a disability under the ADA); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 1018, 119 S. Ct. 1253, 143 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1999) (finding
impairment lasting seven months of too short duration to be disability under ADA) (citing Sanders
v. Ameson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997)
(finding impairment lasting less than four months of too short duration to be a disability under
ADA)).
283. Huckans v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 99-5020, 1999 WL 1079619, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 30,
1999) (unpublished table decision).
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condition as a disability that only lasted three months.284 While one
federal court has held that a plaintiffs inability to work for a year
demonstrated that the plaintiff was substantially limited,285 another
federal court ruled that a kidney condition that required the plaintiff to
undergo multiple operations that prevented her from working for almost
two years was not disabled under the ADA.286 Needless to say, there is
no bright-line rule for the duration of a qualifying impairment other than
the longer a plaintiff has suffered from Internet addiction, the better
chances he or she has to prevail.
3. Permanent or Long-term Impact of the Internet Addiction
Finally, the court will also consider the long-term impact, if any, of
the Internet addiction.28 7 Whereas the second factor focuses on the
length of time that a plaintiffs Internet addiction actually lasts, this third
factor refers to the "residual effects" of the plaintiffs Internet
addiction.288 Courts tend to focus on the first two factors, perhaps
because it is more relevant to analyze "an individual's present, actual
state," as opposed to an individual's "hypothetical, projected state" that
"may require the factfinder to hypothesize as to the future course of the
289
impairment."
Nonetheless, while a plaintiffs Internet addiction may be far from
permanent, the plaintiff could foreseeably experience certain relapses
into his or her condition and symptoms thereof. As the Third Circuit has
noted:
Chronic, episodic conditions can easily limit how well a person
performs an activity as compared to the rest of the population: repeated
flare-ups of poor health can have a cumulative weight that wears down
290
a person's resolve and continually breaks apart longer-term projects.
A condition such as alcoholism, if left untreated, "is likely to have a
permanent long-term impact on [the user's] life. ' 291 Likewise, even if a
plaintiff seeks treatment or takes medication to ameliorate his or her

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Wood, 1995 WL 705139, at *8.
Roush, 96 F.3d at 842, 844.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 98 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id. at 100-01.
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 309 (3d Cir. 1999).
Bilodeau v. Mega Indus., 50 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D. Me. 1999).
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Internet addiction, the plaintiff may possibly still have a relapse of the
prior urges that controlled his or her impulses for so long, or suffer new
symptoms related to treatment, requiring him or her to persist in seeking
medical professionals or medication.29 2 The persistence of such
recurrences could, over time, wear on a plaintiffs health and further
restrict the plaintiff's ability to function regularly. 293 While it is unclear
at this stage of Internet addiction research and treatment how prevalent
such types of residual effects may be in connection with Internet
addiction, if there were such evidence, the court would consider it in
evaluating whether his Internet addiction substantially limits a major life
activity.294
4. Conclusion
To succeed, a plaintiff need not necessarily present evidence on
292. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 308-09 (citations omitted) (finding that even after initial
hospitalization and treatment, the plaintiff continued to be substantially limited by both her
disability and side effects from medication).
293. Id. at 309.
294. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (explaining that the totality
of limitations must be considered in determining whether or not an individual is substantially
impaired, regardless of treatment or corrective measures taken). In evaluating whether an
impairment is substantially limiting, the Supreme Court, in Sutton, added an additional requirement
that heightened the difficulty of satisfying this criteria of the prima facie case, where applicable.
The Supreme Court held that "[a] person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by
medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently 'substantially limits' a
major life activity." Id. at 482-83 (emphasis added). In Sutton, twin sisters claimed that their vision
impairment constituted a disability under the ADA; however, the Court denied their claim, holding
that since the sisters had 20/20 vision with corrective lenses, their impairment did not substantially
limit the major life activity of seeing. Id. at 475-76, 488-89. Therefore, if a plaintiff were seeking
counseling or taking medication to control or ameliorate his addiction, a plaintiff would have to
show that notwithstanding such mitigating measures on his part, he is still substantially limited in a
major life activity. See id. at 488. With the ADAAA, Congress rejected Sutton 's holding, stating
that "[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be
made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures." ADA Amendments Act of
2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(4)(E)(i) (2008). Despite the ADAAA's reversal of Sutton, it is
hard to see how this factor might apply to Interet addiction. Although practitioners are still
evaluating the proper and most effective method of treating Interet addiction, it is unclear that
medicine or rigorous daily regimens would be part of the treatment. Counseling and psychiatric
treatment appear to be the primary focus of treating Internet addicts, and it seems unlikely that
Interet addicts would be taking certain corrective measures that would make an impact on the
analysis of their disability. See, e.g., Kiralla, supra note 12, at 50-51 (explaining the treatment
strategies advanced by Dr. Kimberly Young, a leading researcher in the field of Internet Addiction).
Dr. Young has suggested the following techniques to treat Internet addiction: "(1) practice the
opposite time in Intemet use, (2) use external stoppers, (3) set goals, (4) abstain from a particular
application, (5) use reminder cards, (6) develop a personal inventory, (7) enter a support group, and
(8) engage in family therapy." Id. at 51.
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each of the three factors described above----"the three listed factors can
combine in a number of different ways, even to the exclusion of one or
more of them. ' '295 The existence of a disability is evaluated on a caseby-case basis.296 The three factors constitute a balancing test, which will
be weighed differently in each case, which may result in one factor
being less important or completely irrelevant in a case.297 Nonetheless,
if a plaintiff "present[s] sufficient evidence as to all three factors the case
is no longer 'so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled
to
' 298
judgment, for reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome.'
In sum, it seems unlikely that most Internet addicts could satisfy the
high threshold of a substantially limiting impairment. While many
studies acknowledge that excessive Internet use is indeed a growing
problem and clearly one that has adverse effects on those suffering from
it, those studies seem to fail to show that those negative consequences
are so pronounced that they "substantially limit" a major life activity. 299
However, there could, of course, conceivably be cases of excessive
Internet use that meet that threshold; the example cited in the
Introduction about the young South Korean man who played an online
video game until he died300 may have had a case that his addiction
substantially limited one or more major life activities. Certainly some
plaintiffs, who have severe cases, such as some cited in this Comment,
would have enough evidence to avoid summary judgment, in which the
court must resolve "all doubts and inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. ,,301 Moreover, now that Congress has rolled back the tide of
narrowly construing the term "disability," including the term
"substantially limits," and has mandated that such terms be "construed in

295. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 100 n.6 (lst Cir. 2001).
296. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2001) (citations omitted).
297. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 100 ("The Supreme Court has cautioned that 'in the context of a rule
based on a multifactor weighing process[,] every consideration need not be equally applicable to
each individual case."' (quoting FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 809-10
n.29 (1978) (alteration in original))).
298. Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 95 (1st Cir. 2003) (Bownes, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (quoting FHS Props. Ltd. P'ship v. BC Assocs., 175 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir 1999)).
299. See, e.g., Kraut et al., supra note 202, at 1028 (noting that the study showed increased
Internet use produced "small, but statistically significant declines in social involvement.").
300. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
301. Bacon v. City of Richmond, Va., 475 F.3d 633, 637 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Rodriguez v.
Smithfield Packing Co., 338 F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2003)). Whereas the determination of what
constitutes an impairment or a major life activity is a question of law, whether a plaintiffs
impairment is substantially limiting is a question of fact. Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
490 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443
F.3d 762, 765 n.I(10th Cir. 2006)).
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favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum
extent permitted by the terms of this Act, 30 2 the class of Internet
addiction plaintiffs whose addictions substantially limit them is likely to
grow.
Thus, those plaintiffs would be able to get their cases to a trial.
Nevertheless, the threshold considerations for any would-be plaintiff to
ultimately prevail are daunting.
D. Dischargefor Misconduct v. Dischargefor Disability
Although Internet addiction may constitute an impairment and
potentially entitle a plaintiff to redress under the ADA, his or her right to
redress is problematic due to the fact that the plaintiffs impairment
resulted in conduct that violated his or her employer's Internet use
policy. Employers routinely establish and enforce workplace policies
that govern their employees' rights to use the Internet and e-mail, as well
as the employer's right to monitor the content of their employees
Internet usage and e-mails. 30 3 On one hand, an employer should have
the right to terminate an employee for violating the employer's policy.
On the other hand, the employee arguably has a disability that inevitably
led to the offending conduct.
This conflict highlights an important distinction "between
termination of employment because of misconduct and termination of
employment because of a disability., 30 4 The first part of this conflict is
that an employer must be allowed to terminate its employees who are
engaging in misconduct, regardless of whether such employees are

302. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(4)(A) (2008).
303. According to one recent study, over one-third of U.S. companies have employees whose
responsibility it is to review the company's employees' outbound e-mails. Rosemary Winters, Emailing on the job is risky business, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 5, 2006, at 2C. According to the
same study, about eighty percent of employers have a written e-mail policy. Id. Another study from
2005 reported that nearly eighty percent of U.S. companies monitor their employees' Internet
activities and that over half of U.S. companies are actually reading their employees' e-mails.
Jennifer Robison, Don't Go There, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., June 19, 2006, at ID. With increased
employee Internet use, employers have become increasingly concerned about the cost in loss of
productivity as well as the threat of legal liability and consequently, have implemented Internet
usage and e-mail policies to protect themselves. As one employment attorney remarked: "There's a
simple question of productivity when employees are watching a baseball game or shopping online,
but there are also pretty serious questions of liability for employers as a result of employees using
the Internet to gamble or look at pornography." Correy E. Stephenson, Employer Concerns Grow
With IncreasedEmployee Internet Use, MICH. LAW. WKLY., May 22, 2006.
304. Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Collings v.
Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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suffering from a disability.3 °5 Anti-discrimination legislation, such as
the ADA, was intended to place disabled employees on equal footing
with non-disabled employees, but it was "not designed to insulate them
from disciplinary actions which would be taken against any employee
regardless of his status. 3 °6 If any "normal" employee were caught
abusing the Internet at work, an employer would be justified in holding
that employee to be in direct violation of its workplace Internet usage
policies and subject to termination.
The first principle comprising this conflict is clearly applicable in
the case of employees with drug addictions. Under the ADA, drug
addiction is recognized as a disability.30 7 However, "[t]he ADA
specifically provides that employers have the right to prohibit drugrelated misconduct at the workplace. 30 8 Therefore, if an employee's
misconduct at work was entirely caused by a drug addiction, the
employer would be entitled to terminate the employee for his or her
misconduct even though the misconduct was caused by the employee's
disability. 30 9 For example, in Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 310 several

plaintiffs sued their employer after being terminated for having violated
company rules by buying, selling, or using marijuana at the workplace or
by working under its influence. 311 The court noted that "the ADA
specifically states that individuals who are 'currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs' are not protected under the statute" and that the
employer was justified in discharging its employees for their

305. Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[E]mployers must be
allowed to terminate their employees on account of misconduct, 'irrespective of whether the
employee is handicapped."' (quoting Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir. 1993))).
306. Wilber v. Brady, 780 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D.D.C. 1992); see also Sever v. Henderson, 220
F. App'x 159, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ("Though an employer is prohibited from
discharging an employee based on his disability, the employer is not prohibited from discharging an
employee for misconduct, even if that misconduct is related to his disability." (citing Jones v. Am.
Postal Workers Union, Nat'l, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999); Fullman v. Henderson, 146 F.
Supp. 2d 688, 699 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff'd, 29 F. App'x 100 (3d Cir. 2002) (unpublished table
decision))).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (2000) (covering individuals who have recovered from drug
addiction, those who are presently seeking treatment for drug addiction but are no longer using, and
those who have been mistakenly regarded as having a drug addiction).
308. Collings, 63 F.3d at 832.
309. See § 12114(c)(4) ("[A covered entity] ... may hold an employee who engages in the
illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job
performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory
performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee.").
310. 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995).
311. Collings, 63 F.3d at 832-33 (citations omitted).
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misconduct. 1 2
The second principle that ultimately conflicts with this first
principle is that "conduct resulting from a disability is considered to be
313
part of the disability, rather than a separate basis for termination.,
Even though an employee's Internet misuse violated his or her
employer's Internet use policy, a jury could reasonably find a sufficient
causal link between the employee's disability and the employee's
inappropriate workplace Internet activities to conclude that the employee
was ultimately fired because of circumstances directly related to his or
her disability. 3 14

Since the ADA would not permit the employer to

discriminate against its employee on the basis of the employee's
disability of Internet addiction, the employer would similarly be
prohibited from discriminating against the employee on the basis of the
31 5
employee's conduct that was directly related to his Internet addiction.
The conduct that violated the employer's workplace policy would be
considered part of the employee's disability and also protected under the
ADA.316
While it is indisputable that this "disability v. disability-caused
misconduct dichotomy" applies to employees suffering from an
addiction to drugs or alcohol,3 17 it is far from clear how broadly this
dichotomy spans across the range of disabilities recognized, or that may
be recognized, under the ADA. According to the Tenth Circuit, "the
ADA's anti-discrimination provision 'does not contemplate a stark
dichotomy between 'disability' and 'disability-caused misconduct,' but
rather protects both."' 31 8 In other words, this dichotomy is pertinent in a
narrow set of circumstances, such as with drug or alcohol addictions.
This position seems reasonable in light of the Supreme Court's
statement that when "Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions
to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in

312. Id. at 833, 835-36 (quoting § 12114(a)).
313. Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Humphrey v. Mem'l
Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001)).
314. See Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1140 (finding that a jury may be able to find a strong enough
link between plaintiffs obsessive compulsive disorder and her absenteeism to conclude that she was
fired because of her disability).
315. See McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
316. E.g., id. (finding that a plaintiff's cutting her wrists and firing a gun at her father's grave
reflected her illness and not an absence of 'good moral character' required by a background check
and used as a basis for an adverse employment action (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-704(b)(vi)
(2004))).
317. Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997).
318. Id. (quoting Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 608 (10th Cir. 1998)).
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the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent. 319 Congress has
explicitly enumerated certain exceptions that would appear to argue
against importing this dichotomy to Internet addiction. First, as
previously explained, Congress and the EEOC have explicitly delineated
certain conditions or impairments that can never serve as the basis of an
ADA claim (e.g.,
transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, compulsive gambling, homosexuality,
kleptomania, pyromania). 320 Therefore, if an employee has a condition
that falls within one of these exclusions and engages in conduct related
to these conditions at work, an adverse employment action based on
such conduct is not actionable.
Second, Congress has explicitly excluded employees suffering with
addictions to alcohol and drugs from being able to seek redress for
conduct related to their addictions.32 1 In fact, some circuits have
expressly recognized this "disability v. disability-caused conduct
dichotomy" as being unique to alcohol and drug addictions.3 22 The
Third Circuit has recognized that the application of this dichotomy is
unique to drug/alcohol disabilities.323 For example, in Salley v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc.,3 24 Circuit City hired the plaintiff, who had suffered
with drug addiction throughout his adult life, but had been abstinent for
approximately five years at the time he was hired.325 While working as a
manager for Circuit City, the plaintiff experienced a relapse and violated
Circuit City's drug policy by, among other things, coming to work while
under the influence of heroin.326 As a result, Circuit City fired the
plaintiff.327 The Third Circuit upheld Circuit City's action, noting that
the ADA "operates to allow employers to respond to addiction-related
misconduct in a way that they cannot respond to other disability-related
misconduct. ,328
Third, the ADA exempts employers from the duty to provide a
reasonable accommodation where the employer can demonstrate that the

319. Andrus v.Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v.
United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942)).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2000).
321. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000).
322. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1086.
323. Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 981 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing § 12114(c)).
324. 160 F.3d 977, 981 (3d Cir. 1998).
325. Id. at 978-79.
326. See id. at 979.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 981-82 (citing § 12114(c)).
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329
accommodation would impose an "undue hardship" on the employer.
Fourth, an employee's misconduct is not protected if he or she
constitutes a "direct threat" to the health or safety of other individuals in
the workplace.33 ° In Jones v. American Postal Workers Union,
National,331 a U.S. Postal Service employee told his employer that he
intended to kill his supervisor that same day.332 Following an
investigation into the incident, the plaintiff-employee was terminated.333
The Fourth Circuit upheld the termination, stating that "the ADA does
not require an employer to ignore such egregious misconduct by one of
its employees, even if the misconduct was caused by the employee's
disability. 33 4
In sum, because Congress has explicitly enumerated certain
exceptions to a general' prohibition throughout the provisions of the
ADA, it may be that an additional exception for Internet addiction
should not be implied. In other words, importing the "disability v.
disability-caused misconduct" dichotomy to the disability of Internet
addiction "would make no sense when considering other provisions of
the ADA. 335 With these express exceptions in mind, the Tenth Circuit
stated the following:

The availability of these affirmative defenses establishes that there are
certain levels of disability-caused conduct that need not be tolerated or
accommodated by employers. However, the necessary corollary is that
there must be certain levels of disability-caused conduct that have to be
tolerated or accommodated. Thus, appellees' effort to put all disabilitycaused 33conduct
beyond the pale of ADA protection cannot be
6
correct.

Therefore, since Internet addiction is manifest by the viewing of the
Internet excessively and would in large part be diagnosed on the basis of
such conduct, to allow an employer unrestrained freedom to terminate an
employee with this disability on the basis of the employee's viewing of
non-work-related materials on the Internet may arguably negate the

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
Id. § 12113(a)-(b).
192 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 429.
Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id.
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protection afforded by the ADA to the disabled.337 It is for this reason
that even though an employee's impairment resulted in conduct that
violated his employer's policies, the plaintiff-employee may still merit
protection under the ADA.
V. RECORD

OF OR REGARDED AS

HAVING A DISABILITY

A. A Record of a Disability
Internet addiction may constitute a basis for a discrimination claim
even when the plaintiff no longer suffers from such an addiction. A
second way to qualify as disabled is to have a "record of' a disability.3 38
The rationale underlying this form of disability is to protect "people who
have recovered from previously disabling conditions... but who remain
vulnerable to the fears and stereotypes of their employers., 339 To
qualify as disabled under this definition, a plaintiff must have "a history
of. . . a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities. '340 Therefore, an employer could not base its
employment decision on the employee's history of Internet addiction.
For example, an employee may be terminated for Internet abuse,
but then immediately enter a treatment center. After receiving the
necessary help and having recovered, the plaintiff then applies to be rehired. Being familiar with that employee's experience at the company
and having access to the employee's employment file, the company may
fear that the employee will fall back into the same problem that resulted
in his or her termination and refuse to re-hire the employee. Even though
that former employee is no longer suffering from Internet addiction, the
employee has been denied employment solely on the basis of having
struggled with such a condition in the past. In this case, the employer has
discriminated against that employee not because he or she is presently
disabled, but
the employee has a record of having suffered from such
341
disability.

337. See id.
338. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(k)(2007)).
339. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)).
340. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).
341. See generally Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2002)
(employee alleged he was denied reemployment because of his past addiction to drugs), rev'd on
other grounds, Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
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A plaintiff must ultimately show three things to succeed on such a
claim.342 First, the plaintiffs prior Internet addiction constituted an
impairment that "substantially limited a major life activity." 343 Second,
there is a record of the plaintiffs disability that would inform his or her
employer of the extent or severity of that disability. 344

Third, the

plaintiffs employer had knowledge of and ultimately
relied upon that
345
record in making an adverse employment decisions.
1. Internet Addiction Was an Actual Disability
Although the plaintiff may no longer be disabled by an Internet
addiction, he or she must show that he or she was in fact disabled by
Internet addiction "at some point in the past., 346 In Linser v. Ohio,347 the
plaintiff suffered from multiple mental impairments, however, the court
held that these impairments never substantially limited any major life
functions. 348 Since the plaintiff failed to show that she was ever
substantially limited in a major life activity, she could not show that she
3 49 In Heisler v. Metropolitan Council,350
has a record of such disability.
the plaintiffs employer knew that the plaintiff had been hospitalized on
numerous occasions and was on medication due to her depression, yet
she still failed to show that her depression ever substantially limited any
of her major life activities, and therefore failed to establish that there
was a record of her disability. 351 To satisfy this element, the plaintiff
must ultimately satisfy the elements explained in the prior section and
show that at one point in time, the plaintiff was actually disabled by
Internet addiction.

342. See Sorenson v. Univ. of Utah Hops., 194 F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1999); Colwell
v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 645 (2d Cir. 1998).
343. See Sorenson, 194 F.3d at 1086-87; C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (1997) ("The
impairment indicated in the record must be an impairment that would substantially limit one or
more of the individual's major life activities.").
344. See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 645 ("The record must be one that shows an impairment that
satisfies the ADA; a record reflecting a plaintiff's classification as disabled for other purposes or
under other standards is not enough.").
345. See id. ("This part of the definition is satisfied if a record relied on by an employer
indicates that the individual has or has had a substantially limiting impairment.") (emphasis added)).
346. Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1998).
347. No. 99-3887, 2000 WL 1529809, at *I (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2000).
348. Id. at *1, *3.
349. Id. at *4.
350. 339 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2003).
351. Id. at 630.
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2. The Record
The plaintiff would also have to point to a record that divulged
sufficient information regarding the impairment.352 That record must not
only indicate that the plaintiff had an impairment, but that the plaintiffs
specific impairment substantially limited one or more major life
activities. 353 A literal record will not work. In Dotson v. Electro-Wire
Products, Inc.,354 for example, a medical note in the employee's

personnel file discussed an impairment of the employee, however the
note failed to disclose whether the condition was permanent or
temporary or the severity of the condition.355 In Coons v. Secretary of
U.S. Dept. of Treasury,356 the Ninth Circuit refused to accept that an
employee had a record of disability simply because the employee's
doctor wrote a letter stating that he suffered from various impairments
In EEOC v.
and received treatment for such impairments.3 57
358
a medical
to
accept
DaimlerChryslerCorp., the Sixth Circuit refused
form stating that the plaintiff had hip "trouble" as a sufficient record that
informed the plaintiff s employer that he was substantially limited by his
hip injury. 359 Therefore, a letter or note from a plaintiffs psychiatrist

that he or she was treating the plaintiff for a condition characterized by
excessive Internet use would not suffice. It would need to explain in
some detail how that condition actually impacted the plaintiffs ability to
sleep, eat, think, or work.
A plaintiffs time in a treatment center or hospital would not
necessarily inform anyone of the nature or severity of his or her Internet
addiction. "[S]imply being hospitalized [does not] establish[] a record of
an impairment under the ADA. 36 ° In Winters v. Pasadena Independent
School District,361 the plaintiff took four months medical leave and
entered a facility to treat her depression. 362 Her teaching contract was
not renewed upon her return, and she alleged that her employer

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
Auth., 66
361.
362.

See Vandeveer v. Fort James Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 918, 936 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
Id.; Hilburn v.Murata Elec. N.Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11 th Cir. 1999).
890 F. Supp. 982 (D. Kan. 1995).
Id. at 990 n.2.
383 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 886.
111 F. App'x 394 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 405 n.11.
Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Demming v. Hous. & Redev.
F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1995)).
124 Fed. App'x 822 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 823.
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discriminated against her on the basis of her record.3 63 However, the
Fifth Circuit held that mere hospitalization, even for a period off four
months, did not constitute a record of an impairment. 364 Therefore, a
plaintiff would have to produce a record with the required substance to
satisfy this element.
3. Reliance by the Employer
A plaintiff will have to show that his or her employer relied upon
that record in implementing the adverse employment decision.3 65 Even
if there is a record showing that the plaintiff previously suffered a
substantially limiting impairment, if the employer has no knowledge of
that record, the employer cannot be held liable.366 Ideally, the plaintiff
367
has direct evidence of the employer's reliance. In Norden v. Samper,
for example, the employer informed the employee that her "medical
limitations" were the exclusive reason for her termination.36 8
Nonetheless, absent direct evidence, once the courts have determined
that the employer had knowledge of a record showing that the employee
has suffered an actual disability in the past, the courts seem to treat such
a showing as circumstantial evidence of the employer's reliance upon
that record.369 In Snead v. MetropolitanProperty & CasualtyInsurance

363. Id.
364. See id. at 823-24 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
365. See Thompson v. Rice, 422 F. Supp. 2d 158, 174-75 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting that not only
must the record be one that shows the impairment to be substantially limiting, but it must be a
"record relied on by an employer [indicating] that the individual has or has had a substantially
limiting impairment." (alteration in original) (quoting Hilbum v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181
F.3d 1220, 1229 (11 th Cir. 1999))) (citing Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635,
646 (2d Cir. 1998)).
366. EEOC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., Ill Fed. App'x 394, 404-05 (6th Cir. 2004) (denying
plaintiff relief since there was no evidence that the employer never saw any of the alleged
documents or records of the plaintiff's impairment); Wilson v. Comfort Sys., No. 05-1154-DWB,
2006 WL 3087132, at *8 (D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2006) ("even if Plaintiff [employee] had a record of
being disabled, the Court is at a loss to see the relevance of such a record if Defendant [employer]
had no knowledge of it." (citing Couts v. Beaulieu Group, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1305 (N.D.
Ga. 2003))); Butt v. Greenbelt Home Care Agency, C01-0152-LRR, 2003 WL 685026, at *16 (N.D.
Iowa Feb. 28, 2003) (holding that defendant did not discriminate against the plaintiff based on a
record of the plaintiffs disability since the defendant did not have the requisite knowledge of the
record and plaintiffs failure to produce evidence showing otherwise).
367. 503 F. Supp. 130 (D.D.C. 2007).
368. Id. at 152.
369. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A. 03-1814, 2004 WL 2922074, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2004) (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact that employer
discriminated on a record of employee's disability due to multiple documents of employee's
cancer).
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Co.,370 the plaintiff missed nearly two years of work due to receiving
treatment for depression and stress. 371 Upon her return, her former
manager position was deemed "excessive" and eliminated, and she was
terminated.37
The Ninth Circuit held that the combination of letters
from the employee's treating physicians and her prolonged leave created
a genuine issue of fact of whether she had a record of a disability.3 73
The court did not discuss evidence of the employer's actual reliance
upon such a record for its decision to terminate the plaintiffs
employment.3 74 In Kim v. Potter,375 the court did not discuss evidence of
the employer's reliance on a record, but merely held that the plaintiff
had created a genuine issue of fact that his employer had discriminated
against him based on the employer's
knowledge of the plaintiffs
376
accident and resulting hospitalization.
The type of evidence that a plaintiff needs to produce will depend
on the applicable scenario, however, if the court determined that Internet
addiction substantially limited a major life activity and the employer had
knowledge of a sufficient record, a court may determine that the
plaintiffs employer discriminated on the basis of the plaintiffs
disability.
B. Misclassifiedas Disabled
Additionally, a plaintiff could possibly qualify as having a record of
a disability even though he or she did not in fact ever have a chronic
Internet addiction. The ADA not only considers one disabled if one has a
record of a disability, but also if one is misclassified as having a
disability.37 7 The EEOC provides the example that "[i]ndividuals who
have been misclassified by a school or a hospital as having mental
retardation or a substantially limiting learning disability" would establish
a 'record' of a disability.378 For example, in Anderson v. Banks,37 9 a
school was found to have discriminated against a group of students who

370.
371.
372.

237 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1085-87.

373. Id. at 1089.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

See id. at 1087-90.
460 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (D. Haw. 2006).
Id. at 1201-02.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2007).
EEOC Definition of Disability,supra note 225, at § 902.7(c).
520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
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had been misclassified as mentally disabled. 380 Therefore, if a plaintiff
visited a physician or therapist about his or her obsession with Internet
pornography or chat rooms and the health professional incorrectly
classified the plaintiff as suffering from a chronic Internet addiction, the
plaintiffs employer could possibly learn of the diagnosis and base an
adverse employment action on that knowledge. In reality, the likelihood
of this kind of misclassification is unlikely-misclassification cases are
extremely rare. Since the passage of the ADA, one can probably count
on one hand the number of successful misclassification cases.
VI. REGARDED

AS HAVING A DISABILITY

Another way in which a plaintiff can qualify as being disabled even
though he or she is not actually disabled is that the employer "regards"
In other words, the plaintiff is
the plaintiff as being disabled.381
"regarded as" having "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities., 382 In creating this
definition of a disability, Congress recognized that people can harbor
"myths, fears, and stereotypes" about certain disabilities that are just as
383
In
disabling as the limitations that ensue from an actual impairment.
this way, the "regarded" as claim is "a close sibling" to the "record" of
claim in that they both seek to protect those who have no actual
disability, yet "who may remain vulnerable to the fears and stereotypes
of their employers." 384 Thus, a plaintiff does not need to prove that he or
she suffers from an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity-proof that has been the reason why very few plaintiff have
succeeded as qualifying as disabled under the ADA. The plaintiff need
only show that "he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited
under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether 3or85not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit
a major life activity.
The actionable perception may take different forms: an employer
could mistakenly believe that the employee has a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or
the employer "mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

See id. at 511-12.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000).
Id. at § 12102(2)(A).
See id.
Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998).
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(3)(A) (2008).
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impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 3 8 6 In
short, the plaintiff must produce evidence that his or her employer
"entertain[ed] misperceptions" about its employee.38 7
A. Actual, Nonlimiting Impairment
It may be that an employee visits adult chat rooms everyday for a
half-hour. The employer finds out through one of the employee's coworkers that this employee engages in this daily activity and the
employer consequently fears that it limits the employee.
As an example of an actual, nonlimiting impairment, the EEOC
provides the example of "an individual who has a slight limp that does
not substantially limit any major life activities but who is rejected for
employment because the employer believes that the limp significantly
restricts the individual's ability to walk. 38 8 The limp clearly limits the
individual in some manner, however, it is unlikely that a court would
ever determine that a mild limp would substantially limit any major life
activity under the ADA. 389 However, the employer may erroneously
believe that the slight limp in fact substantially limits a major life
activity of the employee.3 9 ° Perhaps motivated, in part, by "concerns
about productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost of
accommodation and accessibility, and acceptance by co-workers and
customers" 391 that may result from the perceived limping disability, the
employer subjects the employee to an adverse employment action. In
Chalfant v. Titan Distribution, Inc.,392 the defendant failed to hire the
plaintiff for a position that would have required him to load trucks with a
forklift, after learning that the plaintiff had numerous physical
ailments.393 The plaintiff could have performed all of the job duties
despite his physical limitations.394 The court held that the defendant
refused to hire him and regarded the plaintiff as disabled "because it
mistakenly believed that his physical ailments substantially limited his
ability to work in a broad range ofjobs. 395

386.

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).

387.

Id.

388.
389.
390.

EEOC Definition of Disability,supra note 225, at § 902.8(c).
See id.
See id.

391.

Id. § 902.8(a) (citation omitted).

392.

475 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2007).

393.

Id. at 986, 989.

394.

See id. at 990.

395.

Id. at 989 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, the employee's pattern of visiting chat rooms each night
may literally limit him or her in some way, but it would unlikely qualify
as a substantially limiting impairment under the ADA. Nonetheless, if an
employer believes that the employee's daily adult chat room activities
impair his or her ability to work or perform some other major life
activity, and upon that belief, subjects the employee to an adverse
employment action, then -the employee could make a claim that he or she
was regarded as disabled.
B. Substantially Limiting Impairment that Does Not Exist
Under the other form of a "regarded as" disability, the plaintiffs
employer falsely believes that the plaintiff has a substantially limiting
impairment.396 For example, if an employer incorrectly thought that one
of its employees was HIV-positive and, on that basis, terminated that
employee, the employee could have an ADA claim, even though the
employee in fact does not have HIV.397
If an employee occasionally looks at pornography while at home on
the weekend, the employee might start attending group counseling to
prevent his or her conduct from becoming a bigger problem. At one of
the meetings, the spouse of one of the employee's co-workers might
attend the same group and mention to his spouse that he saw the
employee at the meeting. If the employee's co-worker then told their
mutual supervisor that the employee had an Internet pornography
problem, which then led the supervisor to subject the employee to an
adverse employment action, the employee would have an ADA claim,
even though his occasional interaction with Internet pornography would
not qualify as a disability under the ADA. In Moorer v. Baptist
Memorial Health Care System, 398 the plaintiffs co-worker smelled
alcohol on his breath at a work meeting and informed the plaintiffs
supervisor about the plaintiffs drunkenness problems, which ultimately
resulted in the plaintiff being terminated. 399 The court upheld that
plaintiffs ADA claim that his employer regarded the plaintiff as

396. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(l)(3) (2007); see also EEOC Definition of Disability, supra note 225, at
§ 902.8(e). This definition of "regarded as" disability would require the plaintiff to show that the
perceived disability could constitute an actual disability under the requirements discussed in Section
IV of this Comment.
397. EEOC Definition of Disability, supra note 225, at § 902.8(e); Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund,
44 F. Supp. 2d 467, 479 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
398. 398 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2005).
399. Id. at 480.
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40 0
disabled when it terminated his employment.

C. A ChallengingBurden
Regardless of the category in which a plaintiffs situation falls, the
plaintiff will find that successfully meeting the "regarded as" standard to
be no easy task. To succeed, the plaintiff must produce evidence of his
or her employer's misperceptions, or "employer's subjective belief that
the plaintiff is substantially" impaired by the plaintiffs addiction to the
Internet. 40 1 The "regarded as" claim is distinct from an actual disability
or record of disability claim in that it "'turns on the employer's
perception of the employee' and is therefore 'a question of intent, not
whether the employee has a disability.' 40 2 The EEOC has noted that
this particular definition of disability "is directed at the employer rather
than at the individual alleging discrimination. 40 3 For this very reason, it
will be very difficult for the plaintiff to succeed on a "regarded as"
claim. Since the inquiry is "embedded almost entirely in the employer's
subjective state of mind," "[p]roving that an employee is regarded as
disabled in [a major life activity] takes a plaintiff to the farthest reaches
of the ADA. 40 4 The subjective focus of this definition of disability
creates an "extraordinarily difficult" challenge for the plaintiff.40 5
The nature of the employer's subjective belief is very specific. "A
plaintiff claiming that he is 'regarded' as disabled cannot merely show
that his employer perceived him as somehow disabled; rather, he must
prove that the employer regarded him as disabled within the meaning of
the ADA."4°6 In other words, the plaintiff would have to show that his or
her employer subjectively regarded the plaintiffs Internet addiction as
an impairment that substantially limited one of the plaintiffs major life
activities.40 7 It would not be sufficient for the plaintiff to merely show
that the employer was aware of the plaintiffs Internet problem or that
the plaintiffs Internet addiction rendered the plaintiff unable to meet the

400. See id. at 484.
401. See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Service, 492 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied
128 S.Ct. 879 (2008).
402. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1997).
403. EEOC Definition of Disability, supranote 225, at § 902.8(a).
404. Ross v. Campbell Soup. Co., 237 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2001).
405. Id.
406. Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis in
original).
407. See id. at 1169-70.
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employer's performance expectations at work.4 °8
The surest way for the plaintiff to prevail on a "regarded as" claim
would be to produce direct evidence of the employer's subjective
misperceptions. For example, in Ross v. Campbell Soup Co.,409 the
plaintiff suffered multiple back injuries, causing him to take leave from
work for several periods of time. 4
After his fifth back injury, the
plaintiff began to receive negative work reviews and was eventually
terminated. 411 As evidence that his employer regarded him as disabled,
the plaintiff produced a memo that was distributed among company
management, suggesting that the plaintiff not receive a bonus.412 The
memo stated, "Maureen-When can we bring this problem person to a
termination status. P.S. - Back case. 413 This memo, combined with
other incidents, such as the employer recommending the plaintiff to
retire, the employer producing a memo tracking the plaintiffs injury
history, and a supervisor telling the plaintiff that "[w]e can't have
anymore of this back thing," combined to create a genuine issue of fact
that the employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled.41 4
Absent direct, express statements by the plaintiffs employer,
however, the plaintiff may have great difficulty trying to produce
circumstantial evidence of the employer's misperception. Simply
because the plaintiffs employer has knowledge or is aware of the
plaintiffs addiction, that the plaintiffs work is suffering as a result of
his or her addiction, or that the plaintiff is seeking treatment for his or
her addiction does not mean that the plaintiffs employer regards the
plaintiff as being disabled.4 15
In Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.,4 16 the court conceded
that the employer "was aware of [the employee's] health problems, lack
of energy, and mood swings," and that the employer regarded these
problems as negatively affecting the employee's ability to perform in her
job.4 17 However, such knowledge did not raise an inference that the

408. See Walton, 492 F.3d at 1006 (citations omitted).
409. 237 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2001).
410. Ross, 237 F.3d at 702-03.
411. See id. at 703-05.
412. Id.at 704.
413. Id.
414. See id. at703.
415. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 1996) ("the mere fact that an employer is
aware of an employee's impairment is insufficient to demonstrate either that the employer regarded
the employee as disabled or that that perception caused the adverse employment action.").
416. 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996).
417. Id. at 885.
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employer regarded the employee as being substantially limited in a
major life activity.4 18

In Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc.,4 19 the defendant-

employer was aware of its employee's "numerous medical
appointments" that its employee had as a result of an accident, however,
the court would not infer that an employer's knowledge of medical
appointments to treat a condition means that the employer views the
employee as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity.42 ° In Cody v. CIGNA Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc.,42 1 the
plaintiff-employee was a nurse who began to suffer from depression and
anxiety, and as a result, began exhibiting bizarre behavior at work, such
as "sprinkling salt in front of her [work] cubicle 'to keep away evil
spirits.''422 Even though her employer was aware of her abnormal
behavior at work, offered her paid medical leave, and mandated that she
see a psychologist for her depression and anxiety prior to returning to the
workplace, the court held that such knowledge did not show that the
employer regarded its employee as disabled.423 In Wright v. Illinois
4 24 upon learning that the plaintiff had a
Department of Corrections,
military service-related physical disability, the employer required him to
undergo an additional medical exam.425 When he was late for the exam,
the employer refused to hire him. 426 Even though the employer
affirmatively answered an interrogatory asking it whether it considered
the plaintiff to be disabled, there was no evidence that the employer
regarded the plaintiff as disabled since there was nothing demonstrating
that the employer treated him as being substantially limited in a major
life activity.427 In Carruthersv. BSA Advertising Inc., 4 2 8 the Eleventh
Circuit held that an employer's knowledge that an employee has been
diagnosed with a bilateral hand sprain/strain and her resulting work
limitations, its notifying the employee that she would be fired if she was
unable to continue working full-time, and its "advertisement for [a]
replacement shortly after learning of her inability to perform the basic
tasks of her position" did not show sufficient knowledge of a

418.
419.

See id.
196 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1999).

420. Id. at 882.
421. 139 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1998).
422. Id. at 596-97.

423.

Id. at 599.

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

204 F.3d
See id. at
See id.
See id. at
357 F.3d

727 (7th Cir. 2000).
728-29.
732.
1213 (11th Cir. 2004).
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disability.4 29
In short, cases such as the foregoing create a strong presumption
working against a plaintiff and his or her ability to show that the
employer regards his or her Internet addiction as a disability. Absent
direct evidence, the plaintiff would need a great deal of compelling
circumstantial evidence demonstrating not only that the employer
believed that the plaintiffs abilities were impaired by his or her
condition, but also that one or more major life activities were
substantiallylimited by such impairment.
VII. CONCLUSION

Although formal recognition of Internet addiction as a distinct
disorder is still in the future, the research continues to grow and
demonstrate a serious condition occurring with excessive Internet use.
Dr. David Greenfield, a psychiatry professor at the University of
Connecticut School of Medicine has stated the following:
It's not surprising that it is not defined yet, because these things change
very slowly .... But when you are in clinical practice and you are

dealing with people's lives, you can't wait for those issues to be
addressed. There is a huge problem with Internet abuse in the
workplace, and
you can't pretend that they don't exist because there
430
isn't a label.

Only a small segment of the population may qualify as suffering
from Internet addiction. Some from that class might conceivably be able
to show that their Internet addiction is an impairment that adversely
impacts one or more major life activities. However, an even smaller
fraction of that class will be able to succeed in showing that their
Internet addiction constitutes a substantial limitation, thus showing that
one is disabled under the ADA. Nonetheless, some plaintiffs may have
viable claims, and the strength of those claims and number of plaintiffs
suffering from Internet addiction will only grow as the Internet-as well
as the research validating Internet addiction as a distinct disordercontinues to advance and as courts construe the definition of "disability"
"in favor of broad coverage of individuals under [the ADA], to the

429. Id. at 1217.
Holahan,
Virtually Addicted,
Bus.
WK.
Dec.
430. Catherine
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2006/tc20061214_422859.htm.
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